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ABSTRACT 
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It focuses on the subjective and objective components of the systems currently used by 
DHS and the FBI to categorize and resource special events, and it evaluates whether the 
current approach to major event planning is sufficient for contemporary counterterrorism 
challenges.  The thesis considers how changes in the present system may improve 
interagency counterterrorism preparedness.  Finally, it applies risk management 
principles to the interagency special event planning process to determine if these 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
In the wake of the September 11th attacks, elected officials at every level of 
government pledged to take all steps necessary to protect the American people.1  The 
U.S. Congress established the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and scores of 
plans and strategies to address terrorism were crafted by local, state and federal 
agencies.2  Within the past three years alone, the federal government has created or 
updated at least seven separate national strategies that relate to combating terrorism and 
homeland security.3  The proliferation of counterterrorism strategies and plans and the 
realignment of responsibilities in the law enforcement and homeland security 
communities have resulted in role confusion among many local, state, and federal law 
enforcement agencies.  The uncertainty that exists threatens to undermine U.S. 
counterterrorism preparedness.  One area where this has been particularly observed is 
counterterrorism and security planning for major special events.  
The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) plays an integral role in all seven of the 
national strategies, and it has historically played a significant role in counterterrorism and 
security planning for major special events.  The FBI is currently restructuring its mission, 
traditions, and organizational culture to meet newly articulated goals and objectives.4  
Intelligence, counterintelligence, and counterterrorism have moved to the fore; other 
traditional FBI roles have been reorganized and reprioritized.  Like most government 
agencies in the post-September 11th world, the FBI is being asked to do more with less.  
Resource allocation decisions are more critical than ever and these decisions must be 
enabled by sound strategy.   
 
1 Arnold M. Howitt and Robyn L. Pangi, “Intergovernmental Challenges of Combating Terrorism” in 
Countering Terrorism:  Dimensions of Preparedness (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2003), 37. 
2 U.S. Congress, Homeland Security Act of 2002.  Public Law 107-296, 6 United States Code 101, 
November 25, 2002. 
3 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Combating Terrorism:  Evaluation of Selected 
Characteristics in National Strategies Related to Terrorism, Open-file report, GAO-04-408T (Washington, 
D.C., February 2004), 2. 
4 Tanya N. Ballard, “FBI director unveils plan for agency overhaul,” GOVEXEC.com Daily Briefing  
(May 29, 2002), http://www.govexec.com/dailyfed/0502/052902tl.htm (Accessed June 11, 2005); and 
Robert  Mueller, Quoted in:  “Failure to communicate,” by M. Isikoff & D. Klaidman, Newsweek (August 
4, 2003), 34-36. 
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This thesis will review background related to major events management and it 
will identify some of the strategic issues that have emerged in special events since the 
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.  It will focus on the subjective and objective 
components of the systems currently used by DHS and the FBI to categorize and resource 
special events, and it will evaluate whether the current approach to major event planning 
is sufficient for contemporary counterterrorism challenges.  The thesis will consider how 
changes in the present system may improve interagency counterterrorism preparedness.  
Finally, it will apply risk management principles to the interagency special event 
planning process to determine if these principles are useful for developing a rational, 
politically defensible, and fiscally responsible approach to federal resource allocation for 
major special events. 
A. ON STRATEGY 
In recent years the boundaries between public, private, and nonprofit sectors have 
eroded.  The United States has moved to a world in which no organization or institution 
is fully in charge and yet many are involved, affected, or have a partial responsibility to 
act.5  The pace of this change quickened after September 11, 2001 and it has dramatically 
impacted counterterrorism and security planning for major special events.  The increased 
demand for special events planning expertise, the constant tension between requested 
resources and available resources, and the enormous expense associated with special 
events management has contributed to a critical need for public and non-profit 
organizations to think, act, and learn strategically as never before.6   
Strategy is important because it provides a roadmap for solving complex 
problems involving organizations, technologies, and resource allocation within a 
challenging environment.7  Strategy is derived from the strategic planning process, which 
Bryson describes as “a disciplined effort to produce fundamental decisions and actions 
that shape and guide what an organization (or other entity) is, what it does, and why it 
 
5 John M. Bryson, Strategic Planning for Public and Nonprofit Organizations, 3rd Edition, (San 
Francisco, CA, 2004), 6. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ted G. Lewis, Critical Infrastructure Protection in Homeland Security:  Defending a Networked 
Nation, Volume 1 (Monterey, CA, 2004), 4. 
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does it.”8  A good strategy must have established and tested means by which to apply 
resources to the attainment of desired objectives or goals.  This link between strategy and 
resources is critical to the FBI special events management program.  The manner in 
which resources are applied is the essence of strategic planning.9  Goure’ goes on to say: 
A good strategy must strive to be efficient.  Not only must ends be related 
to means; they also must be appropriate and relevant to the objective.  
Strategists speak of the need for a balance between the objectives, the 
methods employed to pursue the objectives, and the resources available.10  
Strategy must avoid means that demand resources in excess of those 
available.  Conversely, merely because resources are available, they need 
not be employed.  Strategy also must eschew overexpenditure of 
resources.11  
Although it would be ideal to write an interagency special events management 
strategy, the absence of a guiding organizational structure that represents the special 
events community makes such an undertaking difficult.  Since applying the process to a 
network or “community of interest” that crosses organizational boundaries involves so 
many stakeholders and because implementation has to rely more on consent than 
authority, the process is likely to be much more time consuming and iterative than 
strategic planning applied to an organization.12
The dynamic nature of homeland security suggests that the identification of 
strategic issues may be more useful at present than attempting to structure an interagency 
plan of action.  Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel note:  “It is in times of difficult change, 
when power inevitably gets realigned in unpredictable ways, that political arenas arise...  
Under these conditions, many things go up for grabs, and people get to feeling 
particularly insecure.  All of this breeds political conflict, especially in strategy making, 
 
8 Bryson, 6. 
9 Daniel Goure’, “Homeland Security,” in Attacking Terrorism:  Elements of a Grand Strategy by 
Cronin, Audrey Kurth and James M. Ludes, Eds. (Washington, D.C., Georgetown University Press, 2004), 
264. 
10 H. Richard Yarger, “Towards a Theory of Strategy:  Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy 
Model,” 1997, Cited in Goure’, 264. 
11 Goure’, 264. 
12 Bryson, 58. 
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where the stakes are high.”13  They go on to say that the more significant the strategy and 
the more decentralized the organization (i.e. the community of homeland security), the 
more likely power relationships are to be accompanied by political maneuvering.  This 
can make it difficult to arrive at a strategy at all.14
The focus of this thesis is, therefore, a deliberate strategy that is limited to the FBI 
special events management program.  It is anticipated that the FBI special events strategy 
may eventually be used as a model for other interagency special event programs.  The 
purpose of this thesis is to identify a way ahead so FBI special event preparedness goals 
may be expressed “in terms of an ‘end state’” towards which the program should strive.  
This is consistent with the recommendation of the Gilmore Commission in its second 
report Towards a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism.15  According to the 
Commission, the idea of an “end state” was critical for three reasons:  1) it would guide 
resource allocations; 2) it would serve as the basis for establishing accountability; and 3) 
it would help establish priorities.16  
Cronin argues that “Crafting a grand strategy against a nonstate threat such as 
terrorism is challenging; the alternative…is to continue to employ policy instruments in 
an unbalanced, often contradictory, and even counterproductive manner.”17  She offers 
three guiding principles towards a grand strategy:  integrate, network, and balance.  These 
principles are essential to a successful interagency effort and they will guide the 




13 Henry Mintzberg, Bruce Ahlstrand, and Joseph Lampel, Strategy Safari:  A Guided Tour Through 
the Wilds of Strategic Management (New York, NY, The Free  Press, 1998), 240. 
14 Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 241. 
15 Advisory Panel to Assess Domestic Response Capabilities for Terrorism Involving Weapons of 
Mass Destruction, Second Annual Report, II. Towards a National Strategy for Combating Terrorism 
(Washington, D.C., December 15, 2000), 4-6. 
16 Gilmore II., 4-6 as paraphrased by Daniel Goure’, “Homeland Security,” in Attacking Terrorism:  
Elements of a Grand Strategy, Cronin, Audrey Kurth and James M. Ludes, Eds. (Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press, 2004),  262. 
17 Audrey Kurth Cronin, “Toward an effective grand strategy,” in Attacking Terrorism: Elements of a 
Grand Strategy. Cronin, Audrey Kurth and James M. Ludes, Ed., (Washington, D.C., Georgetown 
University Press, 2004), 265. 
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B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
This thesis will examine whether the federal homeland security community has 
effectively organized itself to address the threats facing major special events in the post-
September 11th world.  The FBI has historically used its unique authorities, 
responsibilities and capabilities to engage in counterterrorism and security planning for 
major special events.  Since the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, 
however, counterterrorism planning at special events has become increasingly more 
complex.  Although DHS was established to integrate nearly two dozen federal agencies 
under unified leadership “so as to function in a complementary fashion, eliminating 
unnecessary duplication and separating out activities with conflicting missions and 
goals,”18 DHS efforts related to special events management have resulted in duplication 
at the federal level that has created confusion within the special events planning 
community.  This confusion may be negatively impacting counterterrorism preparedness.  
Statutory and Presidential mandates require that the FBI engage in 
counterterrorism planning in support of special events.  As illustrated by the reports of 
the Joint Congressional Intelligence Committee; the 9/11 Commission; and the 
Department of Justice, Office of the Inspector General, the FBI will be held accountable 
to its responsibilities whether or not it actively embraces or is able to exercise them.19  
The goal of this thesis is to articulate a strategy for FBI special events management in the 
post-September 11th world that is consistent with FBI mandates and responsibilities and 
that serves as a potential model for the federal interagency special events planning 
community.  
C. METHODOLOGY    
The primary research method for this thesis was a content analysis of 1) homeland 
security literature, government strategies and reports, and observations of experts in the 
field of special events management, counterterrorism preparedness, and homeland 
 
18 George Nesterczuk, “A Successful Start for the Department of Homeland Security Requires 
Management Flexibility,” The Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder 1572, July 19, 2002, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandDefense/BG1572.cfm (Accessed June 11, 2005). 
19 Thomas H. Kean, Chair, The 9/11 Commission Report:  Final Report of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York: W.W. Norton Co., Ltd, 2004); U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information 
Related to the September 11 Attacks, (Washington, D.C., November 2004). 
6 
security; 2) public sector literature on strategic planning, organizational politics, 
psychology of terrorism, and risk management; and 3) a qualitative review of source 
documents related to the DHS and FBI special events management programs.   
In addition to the content analysis, the author participated in numerous meetings 
and briefings related to major events and was actively involved in counterterrorism 
planning and implementation at recent major special events including the Free Trade 
Area of the Americas Conference in Miami, Florida in November 2003; the Democratic 
National Convention in Boston, Massachusetts in July 2004; the Republican National 
Convention in New York City, New York in August 2004; the Presidential Inaugural in 
Washington, D.C. in January 2005; the National Football League Super Bowl in 
Jacksonville, Florida in February 2005; and the International Athletic Association 
Federation World Track and Field Championships in Helsinki, Finland in August 2005. 
The research material was used in a synthesis approach to identify 1) historical 
background data; 2) emerging strategic issues related to special events management; 3) 
models for strategic analysis and decision-making; 4) applicable risk perception and risk 
management principles; and 5) potential areas for corrective action and further research.  
Because homeland security is a new and emerging discipline, few benchmarks have been 
established that reflect accepted “community standards.”  As part of the methodology for 
this project, the author asked several special events and crisis management professionals 
from local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies (four), federal homeland security 
agencies (two) and academia (three) to review and comment on the draft thesis.  Many of 
their comments and observations have been incorporated into the final thesis. 
D. SIGNIFICANCE 
This thesis will articulate the roles and responsibilities of the FBI so that 
interagency law enforcement and homeland security partners will understand the FBI’s 
approach to special events management.  It is intended to identify a long-term, 
sustainable, strategic approach for the FBI special events management program that will 
serve as a model to the interagency special events management community. One 
expected consequence of this effort is to make the FBI a more effective partner – if not 
leader – in cooperative planning efforts with other government agencies involved in 
special events management.  
7 
                                                
II. BACKGROUND   
The threat of terrorist attack during special events is not new.  At the 1972 
Olympic Games in Munich, Germany, Palestinian terrorists attacked the Israeli Olympic 
team, ultimately killing 11 Israeli athletes.20  In the United States, the 1996 Atlanta 
Olympics were marred by a pipe-bomb explosion that killed one person and injured 110 
others.21  Unfortunately, these incidents are not unique.  Louis Mizell, a former special 
agent and intelligence officer with the U.S. State Department, has logged 171 terrorist 
attacks in sport since Munich.22  Not all attacks have been successful.  Two weeks prior 
to the 1998 World Cup tournament in France, European police foiled a plot involving 
over 100 people in seven countries.  Simon Kuper, paraphrasing the book Terror on the 
Pitch by Adam Robinson, wrote that terrorists planned to strike at the England-Tunisia 
soccer game on June 15, 1998. 
Backed by the former soccer goalkeeper Osama bin Laden, the terrorists 
planned to infiltrate the Marseilles stadium, shoot some England players, 
blow up others, and throw grenades into the stands.  Their colleagues were 
then to burst into the US team’s hotel and murder players.  Others were to 
crash a plane into a nuclear power station near the French town of Poitiers, 
causing meltdown.  It would have been a European September 11, only 
worse.23
The Olympics and other major special events are considered strategic targets for 
terrorist groups because these events carry with them tremendous economic and political 
symbolism.  Special events provide opportunities for terrorist groups to garner 
international attention, inflict massive casualties, maximize psychological impact, and 
build coalition support for their cause.24
 
20Author unknown, 1972 Munich Olympics Tragedy, 
http://terrorism.about.com/od/terroristattacksindepth/a/municholympics.htm (Accessed June 11, 2005). 
21 U.S. Government Accountability Office, Olympic Security:  U.S. Support to Athens Games Provides 
Lessons for Future Olympics, Open-File Report GAO-05-547 (Washington, D.C., May 2005), 4. 
22 Simon Kuper, “Sport and terrorism are now inseparable” in Financial Times (London, England, 
July 9/July 10, 2005), W21. 
23 Ibid. 
24 William Alfano, U.S. Department of State, OSAC Threat Overview, Overseas Security Advisory 
Council (OSAC) 2006 Security Briefing, U.S. Department of State (Washington, D.C., June 17, 2005). 
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Incidents that occur at major special events may transcend the event itself.  In 
addition to its effect on participants and spectators, an incident at an international special 
event may impact diplomacy, politics, business, commerce, finance, or other 
interdependent realms.  This realization led the lead security planner for the 2006 Winter 
Olympic Games in Torino, Italy to conclude recently, “International cooperation is the 
most important pillar in securing this type of event.”25   
A. FBI SPECIAL EVENT PLANNING 
In 1996, the FBI created the Special Events Management Unit (SEMU) to 
centralize the FBI’s counterterrorism planning efforts in advance of large-scale special 
events.  According to the 1999 FBI Special Events Management Planning Handbook: 
The threat of deadly violence wherever people congregate for business or 
pleasure has grown throughout recent years as a result of several 
phenomena: (1) a mass media capability that allows for worldwide and 
real-time transmission of pictures and video, (2) an increased tendency for 
groups and individuals to resort to violence against innocent people in 
today’s asymmetrical world, (3) continued advancements in weapons of 
mass destruction technology that makes these devices increasingly deadly, 
and (4) a greater accessibility to these weapons by groups and 
individuals.26
While these threats were very real in 1999, the American public’s perception of 
risk and sensitivity to terrorism did not change appreciably until September 2001.27  
There is now increasing interest in how the United States deals with events where there is 
considerable ambiguity and uncertainty on the likelihood of their occurrence and their 
potential consequences.28  The FBI continues to be presented with opportunities to 
provide leadership to its law enforcement and homeland security partners through its 
approach to special events management. 
 
 
25 Roberto Massucci, Deputy Director, Italian Ministry of the Interior Law Enforcement Office. The 
XX Winter Olympic Games Security System, Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) 2006 Security 
Briefing, U.S. Department of State (Washington, D.C., June 17, 2005). 
26 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation.  Resource Book:  Special Events 
Management Planning Handbook (Washington, D.C., 1999),  2-1:1. 
27 Howitt and Pangi, 1. 
28 Howard Kunreuther, Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an Uncertain World Paper for 
Distinguished Achievement Award, Society for Risk Analysis Annual Meeting (Seattle, Washington, 
December 4, 2001), 3. 
B. SPECIAL EVENTS DEFINED 
The FBI defines a special event as “A significant domestic or international event, 
occurrence, circumstance, contest, activity, or meeting, which by virtue of its profile 
and/or status represents an attractive target for terrorist attack.”29  The FBI has extensive 
experience in dealing with special events of all magnitude and it has historically split the 
largest special events into one of three general categories:  major sporting events, major 
political events (a subset of events I refer to as politically charged special events), and 








Figure 1.   Three Categories of Special Events 
 
1. Major Sporting Events 
Major sporting events are large-scale sporting contests or games that draw a 
substantial number of spectators or that generate significant media interest.  Examples 
include the Super Bowl, Major League Baseball All Star Game, the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association’s Final Four Basketball tournament and the Olympic Games.  They 
may have some small political nuance, but they are not generally considered to be 
                                                 
29 U.S. DOJ, FBI, Special Events Handbook, 2-1:1. 
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politically contentious.  These types of events represent an attractive terrorist target 
primarily because of the potential for mass casualties and international media exposure.  
2. Politically Charged Special Events (PCSEs) 
Politically charged special events, or PCSEs, require a law enforcement response 
that is different from other special events because PCSEs have wide-reaching political or 
social impact, and they often occur within a highly-polarized environment.  Because of 
their nature, PCSEs tend to receive extensive media attention; they often draw large 
numbers of protestors and demonstrators; and they require a significant number of local, 
state, and federal law enforcement resources.  Examples include major political 
conventions, international trade and economic summits such as the International 
Monetary Fund/World Bank meetings, and large-scale organized protests and 
demonstrations.  These events represent an attractive terrorist target not only because of 
the potential for mass casualties and international media exposure, but also because the 
events themselves have strong symbolic or political significance.   
3. National Special Security Events (NSSEs) 
National Special Security Events, or NSSEs, are specially-designated events that 
“have a national significance and could attract unconventional [terrorist] attacks.”30  The 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has lead responsibility for 
identifying certain events as NSSEs.31  An interagency federal government working 
group that is co-chaired by the FBI, the United States Secret Service (USSS), and the 
DHS/Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) recommends which events 
warrant NSSE status.  This designation does not carry with it any formal funding 
mechanism or promise for resource augmentation by the federal government, but it does 
identify those events which the federal government deems to be of major significance.  
NSSEs may be major sporting events or large-scale PCSEs, but only a small number of 
special events are designated NSSEs.  The 2004 G-8 Summit, the funeral of former 
President Ronald Reagan, the Democratic National Convention in Boston, Massachusetts, 
and the Republican National Convention in New York City were all granted NSSE status.  
 
30 President William J. Clinton, Combating Terrorism: Presidential Decision Directive 62, (May 22, 
1998). 
31 President George W. Bush, HSPD-7: Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and 
Protection, (December 17, 2003).  
11 
                                                
Because of their significance and their potential attraction to terrorists, NSSEs 
warrant greater federal planning and protection than other special events.  Federal law 
enforcement support for and coordination at these events was mandated by Presidential 
Decision Directive 62 (PDD-62).32  PDD-62 provides a framework for federal 
interagency cooperation through a systematic approach to fighting terrorism and 
preventing the acquisition and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD).33  Much of 
this organizing framework was reiterated and reaffirmed in the National Response Plan.34   
For NSSEs, the Department of Homeland Security/United States Secret Service 
(DHS/USSS) has primary federal responsibility for security design, planning, and 
implementation; the FBI has primary federal responsibility for law enforcement, 
intelligence, hostage rescue, counterterrorism, and criminal investigation; and the 
DHS/Emergency Preparedness and Response Directorate/Federal Emergency 
Management Agency (DHS/EPR/FEMA) has primary federal responsibility for 
emergency response and recovery planning and coordination.35 The guidance provided 
by PDD-62 and the National Response Plan is very general, and specific planning and 
resource allocation are left to the individual agencies.  The roles and responsibilities of 
the agencies identified in PDD-62 apply only to events that receive the NSSE designation 
– a very small subset of all special events.  A strategy is needed for organizing the 
interagency approach to non-NSSEs. 
C. FBI AUTHORITIES 
Agencies determine the amount and type of support for different special events 
based in part upon their authorities, responsibilities, and mandates.  The traditional 
federal nexus to special events management is the potential for terrorism – domestic or 
international.  While the potential for terrorism remains the primary connection for 
federal law enforcement authorities, the FBI also has criminal law enforcement 
responsibilities that make it a unique partner for state and local agencies charged with 
policing special events. 
 
32 President Bush, HSPD-7. 
33 Ibid. 
34 U.S. Department of Homeland Security. National Response Plan, (Washington, D.C., January 6, 
2005).   
35 U.S. DHS, National Response Plan, 32. 
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Presidential Decision Directive 39 (PDD-39) and PDD-62 identify the FBI as the 
lead federal agency for terrorism investigations and terrorism-related intelligence 
collection within the United States.36  Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 states 
that the Attorney General, usually acting through the FBI, has lead responsibility for 
criminal investigations and intelligence activities related to terrorist acts and terrorist 
threats.  HSPD-5 also requires that the FBI coordinate the activities of other members of 
the law enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks 
against the United States.37   Additionally, the U.S. Code of Federal Regulations states 
the FBI shall “exercise lead agency responsibility in investigating all crimes for which it 
has primary or concurrent jurisdiction and which involve terrorist activities or preparation 
for terrorist activities.”38  This includes the enforcement of all federal crimes of terrorism, 
including those occurring outside the United States.39
These authorities, and the Attorney General Guidelines, mandate that the FBI be 
involved in planning for and responding to acts of terrorism.  The Attorney General’s 
Guidelines (AG Guidelines) provide clear guidance on how terrorism investigations are 
to be conducted:   
The FBI shall not hesitate to use any lawful techniques consistent with 
these Guidelines, even if intrusive, where the intrusiveness is warranted in 
light of the seriousness of the crime or the strength of the information 
indicating its commission or potential future commission.  This point is to 
be particularly observed in the investigation of terrorist crimes and in the 
investigation of enterprises that engage in terrorism. 40
Effectively policing special events requires strategies that are not limited to the 
use of terrorism statutes.  Specific federal criminal statutes address crimes other than 
terrorism that may be committed at special events.  These include crimes against foreign 
 
36 President William Jefferson Clinton, Presidential Decision Directive 39, (June 21, 1995); President 
Clinton, PDD-62, (May 22, 1998). 
37 President George W. Bush, Homeland Security Presidential Directive 5: Management of Domestic 
Incidents, (February 28, 2003). 
38 United States Congress, U.S. Code of Federal Regulations 0.85 (1). 
39 United States Congress, Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 2332b (f) & (g). 
40 U.S. Department of Justice, The Attorney General’s Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering 
Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise Investigations, by John Ashcroft (May 30, 2002), 7. 
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officials, official guests and internationally protected persons;41 civil disorders and 
riots;42 destruction of motor vehicles;43 solicitation to commit a crime of violence;44 and 
interstate travel in aid of racketeering.45  Under the current AG Guidelines, the FBI is 
permitted to initiate an investigation “when facts or circumstances reasonably indicate 
that a federal crime has been, is being, or will be committed.”46  The unique authority of 
the FBI, when used in concert with the authorities and responsibilities of federal, state 
and local partners, provide tools for the effective management of potential criminal and 
terrorist incidents that may occur during special events.   
D. INTERNATIONAL SPECIAL EVENTS 
Security and crisis planning for international special events is generally the 
responsibility of the host nation, but the United States government has a vested interest in 
these events.  This was recognized in both PDD-62 and PDD-39, which state, 
respectively: 
The first duty of government is the protection of its citizens.  That duty 
extends to Americans abroad, whether they are traveling in an official or 
private capacity.  The State Department, through its chiefs of mission, will 
be responsible…for programs to preserve the safety of private U.S. 
citizens abroad.  U.S. citizens shall be adequately warned of the danger of 
terrorist attack, advised regarding precautionary measures and afforded 
appropriate assistance and protection.47  And; 
It is the policy of the United States to defeat and respond vigorously to all 
terrorist attacks on our territory and our citizens, or facilities, whether they 
occur domestically, in international waters or airspace, or on foreign 
territory.48
The FBI assists the State Department with security and crisis management 
planning and implementation and acts as the lead U.S. investigative agency overseas.  For 
 
41 Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 112, 878, 1116, and 1201 (a) (4). 
42 Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 231, 2101. 
43 Title 18, U.S.C. Section 33 
44 Title 18, U.S.C. Section 373 
45 Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1952. 
46 U.S. DOJ, AG Guidelines on General Crimes, Racketeering Enterprise and Terrorism Enterprise 
Investigations, 10. 
47 President Clinton, PDD-62. 
48 President Clinton, PDD-39. 
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example, the FBI had crisis management experts and agents prepared to help the 
Government of Greece process crime scenes and gather evidence in the event of an attack 
during the 2004 Olympic Summer Games in Athens.49  Unlike the authorities that outline 
lanes of responsibility for domestic planning during NSSEs, there are no specific 
guidelines for U.S. government agencies to follow when planning for an international 
special event.  Based on their experience in Athens, some agency officials at the 
Department of Defense, Department of Justice, and State Department concluded that 
further clarification of the agencies’ roles and responsibilities in supporting foreign-based 
events might be helpful, particularly for planning and budgeting resources.50  A strategy 
is needed for organizing the interagency approach to international special events. 
E. SERL RATING SYSTEM  
Prior to the establishment of the Special Events Management Unit (SEMU), no 
formal process existed to assist FBI planners in determining how FBI resources should be 
allocated in support of special events.  Planners often referred to historic special events 
cases for general guidance, but few “hard and fast” rules existed that provided a baseline 
from which planners could construct a tailored special events response.  Similar special 
events were often resourced differently, and the size of the force deployed for a given 
special event was determined by the political will and influence of the field division’s 
Special Agent in Charge (SAC). 
In an attempt to create a more objective way to allocate resources, the FBI created 
the Special Events Readiness Level (SERL) rating system.  The SERL system was an 
internal FBI classification structure that estimated the attractiveness of the special event 
as a terrorist target and the amount of FBI resources that would be appropriate to devote 
to supporting the event.  The SERL ratings are numbered one through four, with level 
four events receiving the least amount of FBI support.  The four SERL ratings are defined 
as follows: 
1. SERL I.  An event of such magnitude that it warrants the full support of 
the United States Government (USG).  The event will likely necessitate 
the pre-deployment of USG counterterrorism response assets.  The SERL I 
designation will generally be reserved for a select number of events with 
                                                 
49 GAO, Olympic Security, 12. 
50 Ibid. 
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enormous national or international importance.  It requires approval by the 
Department of Justice acting upon the recommendation of FBIHQ.  [An 
example of a SERL I event is the Olympic Games.] 
   
2. SERL II.  Events not of the magnitude of the Olympics, but which may 
necessitate a limited pre-deployment of USG assets.  FBI field offices will 
usually require an augmentation of their own resources.  FBIHQ will often 
assist the field office with coordinating appropriate assistance from other 
federal agencies and departments as part of the overall federal response 
plan.  FBIHQ will designate this level of event.  [The Presidential 
Inauguration, national political conventions, and the Super Bowl are 
examples of previous SERL II events.] 
 
3. SERL III.  Those events that require minimal support from other USG 
agencies/assets, principally tailored to any unique conditions surrounding 
the event.  FBIHQ will normally provide only limited resource 
augmentation to field offices, with larger offices perhaps requiring none.  
FBIHQ will designate this level of event, based upon an appropriate 
recommendation from the affected SAC.  [The Major League Baseball 
All-Star Game and International Monetary Fund/World Bank meetings are 
examples of SERL III events.] 
 
4. SERL IV.  In nearly all instances, these special events are adequately 
supported by state and local resources.  Only minimal support by the FBI 
field office may be warranted.  Other USG agencies may also provide 
minimal or no support.  Unusual circumstances may sometimes necessitate 
the employment of more resources, but they should be specifically tailored 
to address the unique needs of the particular event.  The affected SAC may 
designate events as SERL IV and notify FBIHQ of this action.  [Games 
and events of a local or regional nature are examples of SERL IV 
events.]51 
F. SERL CRITERIA 
Eight factors were identified for use in evaluating how much FBI support would 
be appropriate for a given special event.  Although they are not weighted or ranked, the 
criteria include: 
1. Size:  This includes the size of both the event and the responsible field 
office.  The greater the number of participants and associated staff, 
generally the greater the security and safety requirement.  Size of the field 
office is also an important consideration as larger offices may be able to 
absorb the resource requirements for supporting an event more readily 
than smaller offices.   
 
                                                 
51 U.S. DOJ, FBI, Special Events Planning Handbook, 2-5:2. 
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2. Threat:  Relevant considerations include the state of global political 
affairs, current domestic and global terrorist activity levels, previous acts 
of terrorism or other violence associated with this event, threats associated 
with similar events, current threat directed toward this event or attendees, 
and the realistic degree of danger that known terrorist groups may pose to 
the event. 
 
3. Significance:  Some events have historical, political, and/or symbolic 
significance that heightens concern about associated terrorist or other 
criminal activity.  
  
4. Duration:  Longer events often require more resources than those of 
relatively short duration. 
 
5. Location:  An event’s location may provide an attractive stage for a 
criminal or terrorist act.  Certain locations may require unique capabilities 
to ensure adequate event security.  The geographical dispersion of an 
event is also an important consideration when determining resource 
requirements.   
 
6. Attendance:  Major events may have a large number of spectators in a 
relatively confined space, providing an inviting target for various weapons 
of mass destruction (WMD).  Attendees may also include people from 
disparate cultural, political, and religious backgrounds, some of whom 
may have antagonistic relationships.   
 
7. Media Coverage:  Live media coverage presents terrorists and other 
criminal elements with a lucrative forum for making a statement to a wide 
audience.  Events with national and/or international media attention, 
therefore, may provide a more attractive target than those with minimal 
coverage.   
 
8. Dignitaries:  Large events may draw numerous government officials and 
other dignitaries from around the nation and the world.  Domestic and 
international criminal elements may be attracted to these individuals 
because of who they are, what they represent, or merely because they are 







                                                 
52 U.S. DOJ, FBI.  Special Events Planning Handbook, 2-5:2. 
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The SERL rating system and criteria established in 1997 are still used by the FBI 
SEMU.  Several strategic issues have emerged since 2001, however, that require the 
SEMU reevaluate its approach to special events management to ensure it is doing all it 
can to meet the strategic goal of the FBI to protect the United States from terrorist 
attack.53 
 
53 U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Strategic Plan 2004-2009 




























                                                
III. THE EMERGENCE OF STRATEGIC ISSUES 
In 2004, the SEMU coordinated FBI counterterrorism efforts in support of more 
major special events than any previous time in FBI history.  Several after-action issues 
and lessons learned were observed, and a number of priorities were identified.  This 
chapter discusses some of the factors that have contributed to the emergence of important 
issues that are likely to impact the future of the FBI special events management program.  
The way the FBI responds to these influences will determine its place in the interagency 
special events management community.  
A. EXTERNAL CHANGES TO THE STATUS QUO  
The management of most special events has historically been the responsibility of 
state and local law enforcement officials.  Because of this orientation, special event 
planning has traditionally been focused on crowd control and public safety.  In the past, 
state and local officials requiring federal government assistance would request law 
enforcement “crisis management” assistance through the FBI and would request 
“consequence management” assistance through the Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (FEMA).  Military assistance to civil authorities would generally be coordinated 
in support of the appropriate Lead Federal Agency (for instance the FBI or FEMA, or in 
the event of an NSSE, potentially the United States Secret Service (USSS)).54  Specific 
federal statutes, Presidential Directives, and interagency plans identified the roles and 
responsibilities of federal departments and agencies involved in incident management 
activities.55  It was assumed and accepted that these same roles and responsibilities 
applied to planning and implementation activities for major special events.  The SERL 
rating system, originally intended for internal FBI use, evolved to become the “gold 
standard” that guided the level of support other federal agencies would commit for major 
special events.   
 
54 U.S. Department of Defense, Department of Defense Directive 2000.15:  Support to Special Events, 
(Washington, DC, November 21, 1994). 
55 These interagency plans included the Federal Response Plan and the CONPLAN, both of which 
have been largely been incorporated into the National Response Plan. 
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In the post-September 11th world, homeland security policymakers at the federal 
level have attempted to shift the focus of special events planning away from law 
enforcement and counterterrorism towards an “all hazards” approach.  The terms “crisis 
management” and “consequence management” have been replaced by the single phrase 
“domestic incident management.”56  Although the impetus for this may have been to 
demonstrate that attempts to prevent, protect, mitigate, respond to, and recover from 
terrorist attacks, major disasters and other emergencies require a single, integrated effort, 
this change in terminology masks the reality that there are functional distinctions between 
law enforcement (crisis management) and response and recovery (consequence 
management) operations that require separate subject matter expertise.   
Despite the change in terminology and the shift in focus at the federal level, the 
primary responsibility for special event planning at the state and local level has remained 
with law enforcement officials.  Local law enforcement officials now need clarification 
about where to turn for federal assistance for special events – should they continue to 
look to the FBI for law enforcement leadership or are they expected to forge new special 
events management partnerships with DHS?  Either way, it is incumbent upon the federal 
government to provide clear guidance and direction.  
1. Accountability and Unity of Effort 
In 2002, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that over 40 
federal departments and agencies have roles in combating terrorism, and past federal 
efforts have resulted in a lack of accountability, a lack of a cohesive effort, and 
duplication of programs.57  In the time since that report was issued, DHS has created a 
special events group within their headquarters Integration Staff (I-Staff) and a special 
events unit within their Information Analysis Directorate.  The National Counter 
Terrorism Center (NCTC) has established a special events unit, and the Department of 
Defense (DoD) has established a component within U.S. Northern Command that focuses 
on special events.  Additionally, the United States Secret Service (USSS) has increased 
 
56 President Bush, HSPD-5. 
57 U.S. Government Accountability Office, National Preparedness:  Integration of Federal, State, 
Local, and Private Sector Efforts is Critical to an Effective National Strategy for Homeland Security, 
Statement of Randall A. Yim, Managing Director, National Preparedness, Open-file Report, GAO-02-621T 
(Washington, D.C., 2002), 3. 
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their profile regarding non-NSSE special events and the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and 
Firearms (ATF) has established a group whose duties include providing support to major 
special events.   
While each of these groups has different responsibilities and authorities, each of 
them also has limitations on their authorities that preclude them from providing full-
spectrum coverage for law enforcement, counterterrorism, intelligence and incident 
management for major events.  Special events management requires consistent national 
leadership with the authority not only to coordinate the activities of other agencies, but to 
participate operationally when warranted.  In the post-September 11th environment it is 
less clear which agency or agencies have primacy in coordinating the federal 
government’s response to different special events, and this has resulted in the 
uncoordinated and sometimes inefficient deployment of federal assets and a lack of 
effective integration of federal resources.58
The role of the DHS is to synthesize the efforts of other departments and agencies 
to ensure law enforcement operations and response and recovery operations are 
coordinated.  The responsibility to coordinate is different than the responsibility to 
operate – particularly when new or proposed operations duplicate or confuse existing 
operations.  Although DHS has at least seven operational legacy agencies59, none of the 
agencies possess the range of jurisdictional authorities—both criminal and 
counterterrorism—that are available to the FBI.  For example, the United States Secret 
Service has a great deal of experience in dealing with security related to NSSEs, but it 
has neither the investigative jurisdiction nor the personnel resources to manage non-
NSSEs unless a dignitary under USSS protection is present.   
In April 2004, the Secretary of DHS coordinated the development of the 
Interagency Security Plan (ISP) for the Period of Increased Risk (May 2004-January 
 
58 Several lessons learned regarding the duplication of effort and role confusion have been 
documented in recent internal and interagency after-action reports.  Examples of these reports include the 
after-action report for the 2004 Republican National Convention and the after-action report for the 
Washington Nationals Home Opener in Washington, D.C. on April 14, 2005. 
59 Michael Chertoff, Secretary Michael Chertoff U.S. Department of Homeland Security Second Stage 
Review Remarks, (Washington, D.C., July 13, 2005), 6 at 
http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=44&content=4597&print=true (Accessed July 14, 2005). 
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2005).60   During the process of developing the ISP, DHS created an internal DHS 
Special Events Working Group (SEWG) and an interagency SEWG.  The interagency 
SEWG is co-chaired by the DHS Integration Staff (I-Staff), United States Secret Service 
(USSS), and the FBI.  The Interagency SEWG is composed of headquarters 
representatives from all federal departments and agencies that have responsibility for or 
association with special event security and/or incident management.  It currently includes 
representatives from over two-dozen departments and agencies.61  Although there is 
increased interest and participation in the special events planning process, few agencies 
have realized changes in their authorities or jurisdiction that increase their accountability 
for special events management.  This has increased the complexity of the special events 
planning process.  Every agency now has a voice in the process, but only a handful will 
be held responsible for the outcome. 
The efforts of DHS in establishing the Interagency SEWG and taking a more 
proactive approach to special events management has been a step toward improving 
cohesive effort – one of the issues identified by the GAO.  Unfortunately, it may have 
inadvertently resulted in exacerbating another of the problems identified by the GAO – 
duplication of effort.  Following the establishment of the SEWG, the DHS I-Staff created 
a new rating system for categorizing special events that is nearly identical to the FBI’s 
SERL system.  The implementation of this duplicate system for rating special events has 
resulted in significant confusion among federal, state, and local interagency special 
events planners. 
2. SEHS Rating System 
Derived from several systems in use by other agencies including the USSS, 
FEMA, ATF, and the FBI, DHS created a four-level Special Events Homeland Security 
(SEHS) rating system for prioritizing all special events.  The four SEHS ratings are 
defined as follows: 
SEHS–I: Significant Federal assistance and support for situational 
awareness may be provided to support SEHS-I events designated by DHS.  
                                                 
60 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Draft Special Events Homeland Security Standard 
Operating Procedures, March 2005, 1.  
61 As the Unit Chief of the FBI Special Events Management Unit, the author serves as the FBI co-
chair of the Interagency Special Events Working Group. 
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Potential areas of assistance include but are not limited to threat and 
vulnerability assessments; security planning assistance; information 
management and sharing; intelligence; hostage rescue; counterterrorism; 
criminal investigation; dignitary protection; medical and health response; 
medical intelligence assessments; critical infrastructure protection; 
aviation and maritime security; law enforcement personnel augmentation 
and coordination; nuclear/radiological security; water safety; hazardous 
materials; specialized detection equipment (CBRNE—Chemical, 
Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, Explosive); Explosive Ordnance 
Detection (EOD); civil disturbance equipment and training; canine 
resources; specialized military assets; training and exercise support; and 
other support as required.  Pre-deployment of some Federal assets may be 
warranted in addition to consultation, technical advice or support for a 
specific functional area in which local agencies may lack expertise or key 
resources.  A Federal Coordinator will be designated and a Special Event 
Integrated Federal Support plan will be developed for Level I events. 
SEHS-II:  Selected Federal assistance and support may be provided as 
required to support SEHS-II events designated by DHS.  Potential areas of 
assistance are similar but to a lesser degree than that of SEHS-I.  Limited 
pre-deployment of Federal assets may be warranted in additional to 
consultation, technical advice or support for a specific functional area in 
which local agencies may lack expertise or key resources.  A Federal 
Coordinator will be designated and a Special Event Integrated Federal 
Support plan will be developed for Level II events. 
SEHS-III:  Limited Federal assistance and support may be provided for 
SEHS-III events designated by DHS.  Limited Federal support may 
include consultation, technical advice or support for a specific functional 
area in which local agencies may lack expertise or key resources. Federal 
resources will be available to respond as warranted. 
SEHS-IV:  Special Events designated by DHS as SEHS-IV generally do 
not meet the criteria warranting direct Federal support and involvement.  
DHS, through the HSOC and the I-STAFF Incident Management 
Division, will monitor these events.  DHS may assist state and local 
jurisdictions hosting the event by providing training and exercise 
opportunities through existing and/or tailored programs, as well as 
encourage use of existing Federal assistance programs in preparation for 
such events.62
3. SEHS Criteria 
Eleven factors were identified by DHS as important to the SEHS rating system; 
eight of the eleven criteria are identical to those used by the FBI in its SERL rating 
                                                 
62 U.S. DHS, Draft Special Events Homeland Security Standard Operating Procedures,7-8. 
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system.  The DHS criteria are used for categorizing and designating all special events 
other than NSSEs.  Although not weighted or ranked, the SEHS criteria include: 
1. Size:  Factors include the size of the event, including multiplicity of 
jurisdictions involved and the number of participants and associated staff.  
Larger events are more likely to draw attention of terrorists, or other 
criminals, seeking to cause mass casualties. 
 
2. Threat:  Factors include current threats directed toward this event or attendees; 
current threats associated with similar events; current levels of domestic and 
global terrorist activity; previous terrorist incidents or acts of violence 
associated with the event or similar events; the threat assessment for terrorism 
and civil disturbance before, during, and after the event; and the state of 
global political affairs – geopolitical considerations. 
 
3. Significance:   The symbolic, political and/or historical significance of the 
event. 
 
4. Duration:  The duration of the event. Events lasting for an extended period of 
time often require more resources than those of relatively short duration and 
they potentially provide more opportunities for attack. 
 
5. Location:  The location of the event may provide an attractive stage for a 
criminal or terrorist act.  This factor includes assessment of the capability of 
Federal, state, and local resources available to support the event.  If it is a 
recurring event, local agencies are more experienced.  Certain locations may 
require unique capabilities to ensure adequate event security.  The 
geographical dispersion of an event is also an important consideration when 
determining resource requirements. 
 
6. Attendance:  The number and type of attendees/participants.  Major events 
may have a large number of spectators in a relatively confined space, 
providing an inviting target for terrorist attacks (i.e. WMD).  Attendees may 
include people from disparate cultural, political, and religious backgrounds, 
some of whom may have antagonistic relationships. 
 
7. Federal sponsorship or participation:  Events with Federal presence may 
present an attractive target for terrorist acts.  Such events are also likely to be 
high profile and of national significance, therefore also attractive to terrorists.  
This includes consideration of both the level and complexity of Federal 
capabilities employed. 
 
8. Media coverage:  Focus of national and/or international media attention on the 
event.  Live media coverage presents terrorists and other criminal elements 
with a lucrative forum for making a statement to a wide audience.  Events 
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with national and/or international media attention may provide a more 
attractive target than those with minimal coverage. 
 
9. Dignitaries:  Participation by high-level U.S. and/or foreign government 
officials.  Large events may draw numerous government officials and other 
dignitaries from around the nation and the world.  Domestic and international 
criminal elements may be attracted to government officials and dignitaries.  
The number and rank of the attending officials may affect the assessment of 
the potential threat and the level of the security deemed necessary. 
 
10. Critical infrastructure:  Proximity of critical infrastructure.  The number, 
density, and vulnerability of critical infrastructure sites in proximity to the 
venue must be considered. 
 
11. State and local capabilities:  Size and expertise of state and local police forces, 
other responders.  Adequacy of security capabilities at the state and local 
level.  Adequacy of other state and local resources.  Request by state or local 
agencies for Federal assistance.63 
 
In early 2005, DHS created a master list of special events for the United States 
using the SEHS rating criteria.  Known as the Prioritized List of Special Events, the list 
was created based on events information received from federal, state, and local agencies, 
including the FBI.64  Many of the events submitted by different agencies for inclusion on 
the Prioritized List had been previously rated by the FBI using the SERL system.  Despite 
assessing similar characteristics, the readiness levels arrived at using the SEHS system 
seldom matched the levels designated by the FBI.  Consequently, most events now carry 
two designations, an SEHS rating and a SERL rating.  Agencies that previously adopted 
the SERL rating system to assist them with allocation decisions concerning personnel and 
financial resources are now faced with choosing between the SEHS designation and the 
SERL designation when determining the level of support to provide to a given event.  
It is important to note that neither the Interagency SEWG nor the DHS I-Staff 
have authority over the personnel and equipment committed in support of special events.  
With no real financial “bottom line” at stake, there is no internal restraint built into the 
SEHS rating system.  This creates a paradox wherein subjective political pressure to rate 
                                                 
63 U.S. DHS, Draft Special Events Homeland Security Standard Operating Procedures, Annex B. 
64 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Prioritized List of Special Events (Washington, D.C., April 
8, 2005). 
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a special event at a certain level can overcome the rational and objective attempt to 
classify the event.  This reality, coupled with the lack of a historical reference against 
which to compare SEHS classifications, results in a tendency for DHS to rate special 
events at a level higher than the FBI.  The absence of a single, objective rating system for 
guiding resource allocation for major special events would be an important operational 
issue.  The fact that the U.S. government has nearly parallel but often conflicting rating 
systems elevates this to a strategic issue that must be addressed.  
4. Command and Control 
In order to manage incidents of national significance from an “all hazards” 
perspective, the National Response Plan calls for the Secretary of DHS to appoint a 
Principal Federal Official (PFO) to be the Secretary’s personal representative for any 
incident of national significance.  The NRP states:  
The PFO is personally designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security 
to facilitate Federal support to the established ICS Unified Command 
structure and to coordinate overall Federal incident management and 
assistance activities across the spectrum of prevention, preparedness, 
response, and recovery. The PFO ensures that incident management 
efforts are maximized through effective and efficient coordination. The 
PFO provides a primary point of contact and situational awareness locally 
for the Secretary of Homeland Security. The Secretary is not restricted to 
DHS officials when selecting a PFO.65
Two additional positions that are defined in the NRP are the Federal Coordinating 
Officer (FCO) and the Federal Resource Coordinator (FRC).  The FCO is the lead 
DHS/FEMA official designated to coordinate support in the event of Stafford Act 
emergencies and the FRC is the lead official designated to coordinate response and 
recovery operations during non-Stafford Act emergencies.66  In its draft Standard 
Operating Procedures (SOP) for Special Events, DHS created a new position known as 
the Federal Coordinator (FC) to serve as the primary, although not exclusive, point of 
contact for coordinating federal support for designated special events.67  The FC position 
is not identified in the NRP or any other interagency policy or procedures document.  
 
65 U.S. DHS, National Response Plan, 33. 
66 U.S. DHS, National Response Plan, 34-35. 
67 U.S. DHS, Draft Special Events SOP, 4. 
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Despite its similar name, the FC position is functionally different than any of the 
positions defined in the NRP.  The FC position is described as follows: 
The role of the Federal Coordinator (FC) is to facilitate Federal support to 
the designated Special Event and to coordinate Federal incident 
management and security assistance activities across the spectrum of 
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery, as appropriate.  
Designated by the Secretary of Homeland Security, the FC serves as the 
Secretary’s representative locally and is the principal Federal point of 
contact for facilitating coordinated Federal planning and support for SEHS 
Level I and II events.  The FC will normally be appointed from the pre-
existing nationwide Principal Federal Official (PFO) cadre. 
The FC must recognize that, although there may be various levels of 
Federal involvement, most SEHS I & II events are primarily under the 
jurisdiction of state and local governments.  The designated Federal 
Coordinator is responsible for facilitating coordination of Federal support 
with the state, local and private sector event planners and participating 
Federal Departments.  In order to assist DHS in maintaining situational 
awareness of the event, the Federal Coordinator will provide operational 
and other reports as needed through the Homeland Security Operations 
Center (HSOC) and the I-STAFF Incident Management Division. 
The FC does not impede or impact the authorities of other Federal officials 
to coordinate directly with their department or agency chain of command 
or execute their duties and responsibilities under appropriate laws, orders, 
or directives.68
The authority to establish the FC position was derived from the authority granted 
to DHS under HSPD-5 to establish a Principal Federal Official (PFO) for domestic 
incidents.69  The FC is not the same as a PFO, however, and any non-NSSE special event 
would generally not be considered a domestic “incident” unless something significant 
were to occur at the event.  No specific legislation, executive order, or interagency 
agreement formally codifies the position of the FC, and consequently the position carries 
with it no authority to command, control, or coordinate the efforts of different federal 
agencies.   
 
68 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Integrated Federal Support Plan for Major League 
Baseball 76th All-Star Game July 12, 2005, Detroit, Michigan (Washington, D.C., June 2005), 3. 
69 Robert Shea, Director of the DHS Integration Staff, personal interview by the author, Washington, 
D.C., May 6, 2005. 
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The theory of having a single federal point of contact seems sound, but the 
creation of the FC in the absence of any formal authority or interagency consensus 
obscures accountability and results in duplication of effort.  The Homeland Security Act 
of 2002 grants some authority to the Secretary of DHS to establish positions to help him 
manage the Department, but this flexibility does not tolerate confliction with other formal 
authorities such as legal statutes or presidential directives.  In fact, the creation of the FC 
position may be in conflict with HSPD-5. 
As stated previously, HSPD-5 reaffirms the authority of the Attorney General, 
usually acting through the FBI, to coordinate the activities of other members of the law 
enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against 
the United States.70  Because the responsibility for special event planning at the state and 
local level continues to fall to law enforcement officials, and because the primary interest 
of federal special events planners is law enforcement and counterterrorism, the FBI has 
the lead responsibility for coordinating law enforcement special events planning efforts.   
The fact that the FC may be appointed from the “pre-existing nationwide 
Principal Federal Official cadre”71 is another potential concern for state, local, and 
federal interagency special event planners.  This policy makes it possible for the primary, 
although not exclusive, point of contact for the coordination of federal assets to be an 
executive from the Department of State, Environmental Protection Agency, 
Transportation Security Administration, U.S. Marshals Service, or other agency whose 
core mandates and jurisdiction may not involve special event counterterrorism planning 
or response.  In two recent events, the Federal Coordinators were law enforcement 
executives from non-DHS agencies that typically play a supporting role in domestic 




70 President Bush, HSPD-5. 
71 U.S. DHS, Integrated Federal Support Plan, 3. 
72 In June 2005, an executive from the Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service was 
appointed the Federal Coordinator for the Organization of American States meeting in Miami, Florida.  In 
June 2005, an executive from the Department of Justice’s Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms was 
appointed the Federal Coordinator for the NBA Finals Series games in Detroit, Michigan. 
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understand how state and local law enforcement agencies could be confused about which 
federal agency is responsible for coordinating law enforcement efforts for major special 
events.   
B. INTERNAL CHANGES TO THE STATUS QUO 
The FBI SEMU was originally conceived to manage preparedness activities for 
major events such as the Olympics, World Cup soccer, and the Presidential Inauguration 
but its mission has expanded dramatically since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 
2001.  With this expansion, the costs related to special events management have become 
much more apparent. 
1. Mission Expansion 
Any large gathering of people is now presumed to be an attractive target for 
terrorist attack, and FBI field divisions have responded by opening cases on special 
events that previously would not have merited the attention of federal law enforcement 
officials.  Fueled in part by the fear of potential terrorist attack and in part by public and 
political pressure to demonstrate preparedness, FBI field divisions are increasingly 
requesting the services of FBI national assets to assist with operational response planning 
and implementation for special events of all size, scope, and duration.  The following 
table illustrates the number of FBI special events cases from fiscal year 2000 through 

























2000 6 0 0 0 86 86 
2001 1 0 2 8 99 109 
2002 4 1 3 18 184 206 
2003 0 0 3 40 273 316 
2004 5 1 4 58 317 380 
2005 2 0 3 54 315 372 
Table 1. FBI Special Event Cases 2000-200573 
 
2. The “Cost of Doing Business” 
Since 2001, unprecedented security measures have been implemented or upgraded 
throughout the United States and the federal government has spent billions of dollars on 
prevention, preparedness and response programs.74  In the haste to secure the homeland, 
however, the U.S. may have inadvertently played into the hands of its enemies. 
According to Michael Scheur (Anonymous), the United States may have entered into a 
period of “quiet, steady, unnoticed bleeding:”75   
The 11 September attacks, of course, devastated the U.S. economy; it is 
only now, in early 2004, recovering.  But beyond the immediate impact lie 
massive expenditures – at all levels of American government – that will 
add permanently to the size and cost of government.  In addition to the 
cost of hiring thousands of  federal employees for homeland security 
purposes; acquiring buildings, equipment, and training to make them 
effective; and requiring proportionate upgrading at state, municipal, and 
local levels; there lie what must be substantial amounts of unpredictable 
expenditures for overtime wages – in government and business alike –  
 
 
                                                 
73 FBI Special Events Management Unit, July 5, 2005.  The figures for fiscal year 2005 reflect only 
ten months’ activity (October 1, 2004 – August 1, 2005).  NSSEs are also given a SERL rating, so the 
number of NSSEs was not used in the computation of total events. 
74 President George W. Bush, Securing the Homeland, Strengthening the Nation, (Washington, D.C., 
2002), 31-37. 
75 Michael Scheur (Anonymous), Imperial Hubris:  Why the West is Losing the War on Terror, 
(Dulles, Virginia, 2004), 100. 
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whenever Washington raises the threat level, or when high levels of 
security are provided at public places or functions heretofore not seen as 
serious security risks.76
The economic drain is not limited to the homeland security buildup.  In an attempt 
to fight the “war on terror,”77 the United States has adopted a policy of pursuing terrorists 
wherever they may be – whether at home or abroad.  Preemptive warfare imposes its own 
set of economic costs that threaten to hasten the loss of American primacy.78   Steven 
Biddle cautions, “Since 2001, the government has systematically failed to provide 
revenues sufficient to cover its costs....Barring major changes in American fiscal policy, 
large, sustained expenditures for ongoing preemptive warfare can be expected to create 
corresponding increases in federal budget deficits.”79  The financing for these deficits 
now comes predominantly from foreign lenders.  This transfers capital, and thus 
productive resources, from America to other great powers, contributing to further 
economic decline.80  
The economic impact of securing special events was most recently illustrated in 
2004 and 2005 when the FBI and its interagency partners engaged in counterterrorism 
preparedness and security planning for an unprecedented seven NSSEs within a 13-
month period.  Two State of the Union Addresses, the Group of Eight (G-8) Summit, the 
funeral for Former President Ronald Reagan, the Democratic and Republican National 
Conventions, and the Presidential Inaugural resulted in the expenditure of millions of 
dollars on preparedness activities.  The Presidential Inaugural alone was estimated to cost 
the U.S. and District of Columbia governments over $40 million.81  
The expenses related to the deployment of FBI national assets are borne by the 
FBIHQ Counterterrorism Division, and resources expended in the management of special 
 
76 Scheur, 102. 
77 President George W. Bush, Address to Joint Session of Congress, September 20, 2001. 
78 Steven D. Biddle, American Grand Strategy After 9/11:  An Assessment, Monograph for the 
Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, ISBN 1-58487-188-1 (Carlisle, Pennsylvania, 2005), 
17-18, located at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/display.cfm?PubID=603 (Accessed June 6, 2005).  
79 Ibid. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Timothy Dwyer, “Tight Security, Strong Opinions Dominate a Day Full of Divisions,” Washington 
Post, (Washington, D.C., January 21, 2005), A1. 
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events represent opportunity costs that are not available for other national 
counterterrorism or crime-fighting initiatives.  The table on the following page illustrates 
the actual FBIHQ Counterterrorism Division costs related to recent special events.  The 
figures reflect the cost of travel, equipment, lease of space, Joint Operations Center 
upgrades, etc., but do not reflect the direct costs borne by the supporting FBI field 
divisions or any indirect costs such as salaries or benefits of employees and contractors. 
 
Event Employees on Temporary 
Duty Travel 
Cost 
Super Bowl XXXVIII  
Houston, TX (2004) 66 $172,355.00 
Super Bowl XXXIX 
Jacksonville, FL (2005) 191 $640,161.00 
Major League All Star Game  
Houston, TX (2004) 6 $6,000.00 
Major League All Star Game* 
Detroit, MI (2005) 48 ~$76,407.00 
G-8 Summit 
Sea Island, GA (2004) 865 $2,875,685.00 
Republican National Convention 
New York City, NY (2004) 62 $264,000.00 
Democratic National Convention 
Boston, MA (2004) 104 $482,831.00 
Summer Olympic Games 
Athens, Greece (2004) 123 $3,025,241.00 
Total 1465 $7,542,680.00 
Table 2. FBI Major Special Events Costs 2004-2005. 82 
 
The increased demand for special events planning expertise, the constant tension 
between requested resources and available resources, and the enormous expense 
associated with special events management has contributed to a critical need for the FBI 
to reevaluate the way it manages special events.  In short, the need exists for the FBI to 
adopt a more strategic approach to managing special events. 
                                                 
82 FBI Special Events Management Unit, July 5, 2005. 
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IV. TOWARDS A STRATEGIC APPROACH  
The emergence of unique challenges and new strategic issues requires a 
realignment of FBI strategy.  In order to respond effectively to changes in their 
environments, public and non-profit organizations must understand the external and 
internal contexts within which they find themselves.83  One way to accomplish this is to 
conduct an analysis that addresses the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and 
challenges facing an organization.84   
A. SWOC ANALYSIS 
A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges (SWOC) analysis of the 
FBI’s SEMU was conducted to identify the external and internal issues related to the 
FBI’s special events management program.  This analysis was conducted as a part of an 
overall reevaluation of the FBI’s approach to special events management in the post-9/11 
world.  It was anticipated that by identifying strategic issues facing the FBI, similar issues 
would be identified within the greater special events management community.  
Consistent with the framework identified by Bryson, four questions were addressed 
during the SWOC analysis.85  The questions addressed during the SWOC analysis are 
listed below:  
What major external or future opportunities are available to the FBI? 
What major external or future challenges are facing the FBI? 
What are the FBI’s major internal or present strengths? 
What are the FBI’s major internal or present weaknesses? 
The full results of the SWOC analysis are listed in Appendix A.  Bryson divides 
the issues facing organizations into two broad categories:  strategic issues and operational 
issues.  “Generally, strategic issues imply a need for exploring or creating new 
knowledge, whereas operational issues imply exploiting existing knowledge.”86  From 
the list generated during the SWOC analysis, several strategic issues emerged: 
• The FBI has long been involved in the process of planning for and 
managing special events.  Major sports contests, political conventions, 
 
83 Bryson, 123. 
84 Ibid., 125. 
85 Ibid., 141. 
86 Bryson, 155. 
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large-scale demonstrations, and other high-profile events have historically 
involved logistics planning and interagency coordination.  There are now 
more participants and seemingly less clarity about who does what – what 
is the appropriate way ahead?   
• The FBI’s Special Event Readiness Level system provides guidance for 
the amount of support to be provided to special events that are managed 
by FBI field offices.  How valid are the eight criteria that have been 
historically used to evaluate special events and to set the SERL rating?    
Do these criteria need further definition now that there are more players in 
the process?  Can the FBI criteria be reconciled with the DHS criteria for a 
single interagency rating system for all special events? 
• The FBI must find a more effective way to manage special events and to 
handle counterterrorism preparedness.  This can/should be done under a 
single strategic plan that is both 1) rational, and 2) politically defensible.  
This will require an analysis of objective and subjective factors that 
influence the management of special events.  It is expected that models 
will need to be developed and evaluated in terms of risk management and 
cost-effectiveness.  
• FBI and interagency partners need to integrate services rather than 
replicate them.  How can the FBI integrate its assets and resources with 
interagency partners to support counterterrorism efforts at special events 
in a coordinated, comprehensive, and fiscally responsible way?   
B. SYSTEMS ANALYSIS 
Resolution of these issues requires an understanding of the objective and 
subjective components of the system currently used by the FBI to manage special events.  
This systems analysis approach will help to frame the complex issues in a way so they 
can be modeled and more fully understood.87  This will allow the FBI to identify possible 
ways to improve the approach to special events management and it will contribute to a 
more systematic process for making resource allocation decisions. 
1. Objective Factors 
Objective analysis is a deliberation made from a less than personal or neutral 
viewpoint.88  It uses scientific, often quantitative, methods to measure the likelihood of a 
threat or incident and to identify known threats, vulnerabilities, and risks.  Each special 
event is unique, and most are influenced by innumerable variables that are not easily 
quantified.  For these reasons, purely objective analysis in the field of special events 
 
87 Bryson., 46. 
88 Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Objective_analysis (Accessed 
June 18, 2005). 
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management is impossible.  A type of objective analysis that may be useful for special 
events planners is the “empirical research” methodology used by courts to determine if 
psychological treatments are considered to be legitimate.  This methodology requires 
evidence of conventional use by peers, evidence of use by a “significant minority” of 
practitioners, and evidence of cost effectiveness.89   
As noted previously, the FBI developed the SERL system in an attempt to create 
an objective way to allocate resources for major special events.  In the context within 
which the SERL system was developed, it can be considered a somewhat objective 
analysis.  Consideration is given to certain criteria and, based on the results of the 
analysis an event is given a readiness level.  This approach was appropriate for the 
number of events worked by the FBI prior to September 11, 2001 because there was 
generally consensus about what constituted a major special event and what 
counterterrorism assets and capabilities would be required to support a significant event.  
The system was adopted and used by a number of federal agencies involved in special 
events planning, and it allowed the agencies to determine relative resource levels for 
different level events.  The SERL system worked as it was intended, and it was as 
objective as it needed to be.  The current system may no longer be effective. 
As the number of special events managed by the FBI has increased, the 
distinctions between resource levels have blurred and there are few clear benchmarks 
against which to measure different resource needs within a given SERL.  The eight SERL 
criteria have long been defined, but they are not weighted or ranked and no subordinate 
criteria have been identified or developed to help planners determine SERL ratings for 
new or unique special events.  For instance, when an event is rated based on “size,” there 
is no direct correlation between the number of participants in an event and its SERL 
rating.  If the analysis were to be truly objective, thresholds would be established that 
would ensure that as the number of participants increased, consideration would be given 
to increasing the SERL rating.  Establishment of a matrix that would break each of the 
eight criteria into threshold levels would be a good first step toward improving objective 
 
89 Dr. Larry Beutler, Psychology of Fear Management and Terrorism, Lecture at the Naval 
Postgraduate School (Monterey, CA, April 12, 2005). 
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analysis and informing the resource allocation decision-making process.  A potential 
starting point for development of this matrix is offered at Appendix B.   
2. Subjective Factors 
Subjective analysis refers to a deliberation where the feelings of the individuals 
taking part determine the outcome.90  It uses judgment, experience, intuition, and other 
qualitative methods to identify possibilities related to threats, vulnerabilities, and risks.  
Subjective analysis may include interpretation or bias, but it is necessary for the synthesis 
and integration of information.  Subjective analysis equates to what psychologists call the 
“clinical wisdom” approach to mental health treatment.  Many treatments are assumed to 
work because of the experiences of those who use them.  What is important in this 
approach is how long someone has used a particular treatment program, how many times 
they have used it, and the concrete examples they provide as to how it worked.  Decisions 
are made based on clinical experience, good intentions, and “reasonable theory.”91
Subjective analysis is the dominant approach to special events management in the 
FBI.  The structure of the current special events management program presumes that 
sufficient expertise exists both in the field and at FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) to ensure 
that events are resourced appropriately.  Staffing shortfalls and the reallocation of 
personnel to more critical counterterrorism programs have combined to make this 
approach unreliable.  Experience with event planning, crisis management, major 
investigations and tactical operations is critical in determining the resources required to 
manage any given event.  This experience varies from one office to the next.  Large field 
offices such as New York and Washington are accustomed to managing large groups of 
people and significant special events.  Small field offices may have very limited 
experience with special events.  Ironically, the subjectivity in the current system may 
result in large offices under-reacting to certain special events and may result in these 
offices being caught unprepared.  Small offices on the other hand may over-react to 
events and may misapply critical financial and personnel resources.  Neither approach is 
efficient or effective.   
 
90 Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopedia, at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Subjective_analysis (Accessed 
June 18, 2005). 
91 Beutler. 
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Woo argues that the use of expert judgment (subjectivity) is not a very reliable 
approach and that an underlying structural event model is needed.  He concludes “It is 
hard to avoid a fair measure of expert judgment in terrorism risk assessment, but 
minimizing subjectivity is key to the scientific evolution of terrorism risk modeling.”92   
3. Other Factors 
The FBI’s approach to crisis management and special event planning presumes a 
three-tiered national response.  A Tier I response is the responsibility of the local field 
division.  A Tier II response occurs when the incident or event exceeds the capability of a 
single office or it becomes protracted and there is a need for relief teams from 
neighboring offices.  A Tier III response is a full national response involving specialized 
national assets.  The level of response is dictated by the FBI’s on-scene commander, with 
concurrence from FBIHQ.   
The three-tiered response system is effective for managing critical incidents and 
major FBI investigations, but this structure is not sufficient to support the planning that is 
required for special events.  Although some responders to a given critical incident may be 
selected based on knowledge and experience, the overall tiered response structure is 
based on geography.  Not all field divisions or regions have similar experience in dealing 
with the national plans and policies that impact major special event planning, and no 
detailed template exists that guides field managers through the nuances of the special 
event planning process.  Consequently, field-based planners may call for regional 
resources when they are not necessarily warranted, or they may avoid calling for pre-
positioned assets until it is too late to manage the logistics associated with their 
deployment.  This negatively impacts consistency in the national special events 
management program, and fails to capitalize on the experience and expertise of 
headquarters-based special events program managers.   
Even within FBI headquarters divisions, however, there is some inconsistency in 
the special events program.  The FBI has separate headquarters units in disparate 
divisions that have responsibility for planning for special events and critical incidents.  
The SEMU is managed under the Counterterrorism (CT) program at FBI Headquarters 
 
92 Dr. Gordon Woo, The Evolution of Terrorism Risk Modeling, Submitted for the Journal of 
Reinsurance (London, England, April 22, 2003), 3. 
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and its planning efforts have historically been focused on deploying and staging assets for 
counterterrorism response.  The SEMU coordinates the administration and logistics 
related to the deployment of crisis managers, tactical personnel, explosives and hazardous 
materials specialists, and intelligence analysts, but field division personnel generally 
determine how to use the specialty assets.   
The Crisis Management Unit (CMU) within the Critical Incident Response Group 
(CIRG) primarily conducts planning for critical incidents, but it also has some 
responsibility for special event planning.  CIRG is an operational FBI headquarters 
division based in Quantico, Virginia that manages most of the FBI specialty assets that 
are deployed to assist with major special events and other incidents of national 
significance.  CIRG assets are employed to assist with critical incidents and major 
investigations under both the counterterrorism and criminal investigative programs.  
CMU has significant experience with high-profile criminal cases, interagency command 
post operations, case information management, and operational integration of local, state, 
and federal resources during critical incidents.  Co-locating these planning operations 
would improve consistency, increase accountability and reduce duplication of effort.   
C. REALITY CHECK  
The FBI currently uses a combination of objective and subjective factors to 
determine how to resource major special events, but the approach is disproportionately 
subjective.  As the reports of the Joint Congressional Intelligence Committee, the 9/11 
Commission, and the Department of Justice Office of the Inspector General illustrate, 
another terrorist attack will be reviewed with intense scrutiny.93  Questions will 
inevitably come about how counterterrorism planning was conducted and how resource-
allocation decisions were made.  If the FBI is to create a rational, politically defensible 
and fiscally responsible approach to resource allocation for special events, it should 
consider restructuring the special events program to make it more effective.  This will 
demonstrate that the FBI takes its counterterrorism preparedness responsibilities 
seriously, and that it has the flexibility and adaptability required for success in the post-
 
93 Thomas H. Kean, Chair, The 9/11 Commission Report:  Final Report of the National Commission 
on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States (New York, W.W. Norton Co., Ltd, 2004); U.S. Department of 
Justice, Office of the Inspector General, A Review of the FBI’s Handling of Intelligence Information 
Related to the September 11 Attacks (Washington, D.C., November 2004). 
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9/11 world.  Finally, reorganization of the FBI’s SEMU to address its strategic issues 
could serve as a catalyst for change in the wider special events management community.  
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V. EXPLORATION OF DECISION-MAKING MODELS 
An initial objective of this project was to explore whether an objective decision-
making model such as Model-Based Vulnerability Analysis (MBVA) could be used to 
identify a more systematic way to allocate resources for special events.  Designed for 
achieving critical infrastructure protection under budgetary constraints, MBVA is a 
comprehensive method of analysis that combines network, fault, event, and risk analysis 
into a single methodology for quantitatively analyzing a sector component such as a 
hub.94  MBVA is a scientific, rational approach that would provide an empirical basis for 
resource allocation decisions.  It was hoped that MBVA would be able to predict the 
consequences of alternatives, provide a means for cost analysis, and contribute to the 
development of measures of effectiveness and risk.  Finally, it was hoped MBVA would 
provide an objective basis for communicating critical trade-offs and to articulate ways to 
manage the risk and uncertainty that surrounds special events.  
A. RATIONAL PLANNING MODEL 
It quickly became apparent that MBVA would not be the best decision-making 
model for special events management.  Consistent with what Bryson calls the rational 
planning model, MBVA favors the use of quantifiable, objective criteria to assist with 
resource allocation decisions.  The rational-deductive approach to decision making 
begins with goals; policies, programs, and actions are then deduced to achieve these 
goals.95  The rational model is a fundamental social science model for how human beings 
behave.  It requires certain assumptions, including the following:96   
• Human beings have objectives and they organize everything they do to 
achieve those objectives.  They weigh costs/benefits logically to determine 
if their actions will achieve stated objectives. 
• People know the alternatives and know they have choices. 
• People understand the consequences of their choices. 
• People can assess the probability of the outcomes based upon their actions. 
 
94 Lewis, Chapter 5, 2. 
95 Bryson, 17-18. 
96 David Tucker, Asymmetric Warfare and Homeland Security, Lecture at the Naval Postgraduate 
School (Monterey, CA, June 17, 2004). 
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This model may not be flexible enough to account for the complex network of 
relationships that must be developed during the special event planning process.  Bryson 
notes that a fundamental assumption of the rational model is that either there will be a 
consensus on goals, policies, programs, and actions necessary to achieve organizational 
aims or there will be someone with enough power and authority that consensus does not 
matter.97  Planning for special events requires the identification of numerous 
stakeholders, identification of issues of import to those stakeholders and the development 
of personal relationships to resolve the issues as planning moves forward.   
Event planning requires a networked rather than hierarchical structure, and 
complex interdependencies are often infused with emotions, politics, and power.98  
Consensus must be built – it cannot be demanded or rationalized through the use of 
probability and statistics.  Woo argues: 
The most rigorous attitude to any risk model development spurns the 
excessive use of expert judgment, and terrorism risk is no exception.  The 
use of expert judgment can be minimized through exploring and 
developing mathematical models and simulations of the underlying 
causative processes, which can then be parameterized from observational 
data.99   
This type of approach is not likely to receive the endorsement of police, 
firefighters, paramedics, and emergency managers because they recognize the value of 
flexibility and adaptability in problem solving. 
B. POLITICAL PLANNING MODEL 
Special event planning has a political decision-making component that cannot be 
captured in the rational planning model.  Almost all imaginable organizations, private as 
well as public, are at least mildly or occasionally political.100 Any decision-making 
approach that does not acknowledge politics and power assumes that senior managers are 
rational actors who define strategies that everyone else embraces, compliant and loyal 
“labor inputs” that they are.101  We know this is not true in most organizations, and it is 
 
97 Bryson, 18. 
98 Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, 235. 
99 Woo, 3. 
100 Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, 240. 
101 Ibid., 236. 
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certainly not true in collaborative organizational politics.  Public servants are not mere 
“robots” who implement the strategies that spring “fully armed from the forehead of an 
omniscient policymaker.”102  The politics and power school of strategic management is 
consistent with Bryson’s political decision-making model.  This model is inductive, not 
deductive.  It begins with issues, which almost by definition involve conflict, not 
consensus.103  Bohlman and Deal have set out the following propositions about the world 
of organizational politics. 
1. Organizations are coalitions of various individuals and interest groups.   
2. There are enduring differences among coalition members in values, 
beliefs, information, interests, and perceptions of reality.   
3. Most important decisions involve the allocation of scarce resources—who 
gets what. 
4. Scarce resources and enduring differences give conflict a central role in 
organizational dynamics and make power the most importance resource. 
5. Goals and decisions emerge from bargaining, negotiation, and jockeying 
for position among different stakeholders (original emphasis included).104 
In special events management, issues are often resolved through the 
implementation of various policies and programs that serve as treaties that represent a 
reasonable level of agreement among the various stakeholder groups.  Various actors and 
coalitions of actors pursue their own interests and agendas, and special events managers 
must maneuver through a complex world of human relationships wherein people must put 
aside their personal differences to focus on the desired outcome.  Subjectivity and the 
influence of political nuance are an inescapable reality of the landscape of special events 
management. 
C. A HYBRID APPROACH   
The ideal strategic planning model for special events must therefore be a hybrid 
that includes components of both the rational decision-making and political decision-
making models.  The successful model must take into account objective and subjective 
factors in a comprehensive, integrated systems approach.   The use of objective tools will 
 
102 Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, 240. 
103 Bryson, 18. 
104 L.G. Bolman and T. E. Deal, Reframing Organizations: Artistry, Choice, and Leadership, Second 
Ed., (San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 1997), cited in Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, 239. 
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ensure that the model can be logically defended, replicated, and applied consistently 
across different types of special events.  The use of subjective tools based upon common 
assumptions agreed upon by key stakeholders will ensure that those elements most prone 
to subjective interpretation are viewed as starting points for negotiation rather than 
unyielding end-states.  The hybrid approach allows special events planners to control the 
influence of subjective factors (such as undue political pressure) rather than engage in the 
futile pursuit of attempting to eliminate them.  This is the essence of balance – one of 
Cronin’s three guiding principles for a grand strategy.  
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VI. THE APPLICATION OF RISK MANAGEMENT PRINCIPLES 
The practice of Homeland Security requires the application of information and 
insight from a number of different disciplines to a new set of problems.  It is anticipated 
that by linking an understanding of risk perception with the tools of risk assessment, the 
FBI may be able to develop risk management options that are likely to be successfully 
implemented in the management of special events.105  A risk assessment methodology 
can support a homeland security strategy that prioritizes responses to threats, including 
investments of resources on the basis of both the likelihood of an event and the 
consequences should one occur.106   
The 9/11 Commission recommended that homeland security assistance should be 
based on an assessment of risks and vulnerabilities.107  The National Strategy for 
Homeland Security states, “…we must carefully weigh the benefit of each homeland 
security endeavor and only allocate resources where the benefit of reducing risk is worth 
the amount of additional cost.”108  The most effective way to apply a risk-based approach 
is by using the trio of threat, vulnerability and consequence as a general model for 
assessing risk and deciding on the protective measures we undertake.109  These guiding 
principles will be the basis for discussion in this chapter.   
A. THREE FUNDAMENTAL VIEWS OF RISK 
Risk in the modern world is confronted and dealt with in three 
fundamental ways.  Risk as feelings refers to our fast, instinctive, and 
intuitive reactions to danger.  Risk as analysis brings logic, reason, and 
scientific deliberation to bear on hazard management.  When our ancient 
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instincts and our modern scientific analyses clash, we become painfully 
aware of a third reality…risk as politics.110
Special events management requires an understanding of risk on all three of these 
levels.  With respect to risk as feelings, risk perception and the fear that innocent people 
will fall victim to a terrorist attack is perhaps the primary reason we conduct security 
planning and counterterrorism preparedness activities in support of major events.  Threat 
assessments, vulnerability assessments, and criticality assessments are the way we 
attempt to measure risk as analysis so we can construct our operational response plans 
accordingly.  Finally, risk as politics comes into play when justification is required to 
support budget or resource requests or when risk plays a part of a powerful political 
agenda.   
1. Risk as Feelings  
The concept of risk as feelings was illustrated recently by John Tirman, executive 
director of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies 
when he stated:  “Is there a significant threat of a terrorist attack against America?  We 
don’t know the answer to that question, but a large number of Americans do believe there 
is such a threat.”111  Risk as feelings includes the perception of risk and it involves the 
study of affect and emotion on decision making.112  There is a growing body of evidence 
that suggests that people do not make decisions based solely on empirical data such as 
risk probability or incident statistics.  In fact, the evidence suggests that individuals make 
decisions in ways that differ from the rational model of choice.113  Research confirms 
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brain is wired to key in on potential and perceived threats.114  We react with more 
intensity to negative experiences, and negative information is perceived as more credible 
than positive information.115  
Risk as feelings is influenced by the availability heuristic, the affect heuristic, and 
probability neglect.  The availability heuristic suggests that because negative experiences 
are more powerful than positive experiences, they are more easily recalled in human 
memory – they are more available to our memories.  If negative images are more easily 
recalled, our brain makes them seem like they are more likely to occur.116  This 
obviously impacts our perception of risk.  The affect heuristic suggests that if something 
is a threat, and there is a novelty or uniqueness to it, we perceive it as a greater risk.  
When coupled with feelings of dread (i.e. if something appears to have a dreadful, 
emotional result) we see it as having greater risk, even if the likelihood of an event 
occurring is the same.117  Lastly, because of the emotional and affective aspects that our 
sophisticated human judgment is predisposed to consider, we do not normally weigh 
things by the statistical likelihood they will happen.  This is the essence of probability 
neglect.118   
Breckenridge and Zimbardo argue that peoples’ reactions are more complex than 
a mere visceral sense of danger to self, and multifaceted aspects of the publics’ fears can 
strongly influence their trust in and support for government policy.119  Kunreuther and 
his colleagues found that many individuals invest in security to relieve anxiety and worry 
about what they perceive might happen to them or to others so as to gain piece of 
mind.120 Slovic, et. al. found that the experiential system operates in parallel with the 
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rational system, and that each seems to depend upon the other for guidance.121  This 
suggests that much more must be considered than just the probability of an event 
occurring and the consequences that may result from the event.   
An understanding of the nature of emotionally-based judgment and perception 
allows special events planners to distance themselves from the subjective influences that 
can impact their resource allocation decisions.  It ensures that their planning efforts are 
not negatively influenced by a disproportionate fear of terrorist attack.122  It is widely 
recognized that “the distinguishing feature of terrorism is fear and this fear is stimulated 
by threat of indiscriminant and horrifying forms of violence directed against ordinary 
people everywhere.”123  Recognizing the role that fear plays in terrorism allows 
counterterrorism professionals to focus not on perceived threats but rather on actual 
threats identified through comprehensive risk analysis.  Recognizing that some degree of 
proportionate fear is warranted, however, provides a subjective check that balances the 
otherwise cold, objective, rational analysis. 
Finally, there is a need to bring together interested parties from the private sector, 
representatives from public interest groups, leaders from regulatory agencies and other 
governmental organizations as well as representatives from the public to deal with risk 
management strategies.124  This public-private integration strategy gives value beyond 
the scheduled special event, and it will ensure that risk management strategies are 
informed by a community of experience rather than a handful of “experts.”  This strategy 
will allow those who allocate resources for counterterrorism to more fully appreciate the 
difference between investing in reassurance versus investing in long-term strategies 
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2. Risk as Analysis    
The Government Accountability Office (GAO) defines risk management as “a 
systematic and analytical process to consider the likelihood that a threat will endanger an 
asset, individual, or function and to identify actions to reduce the risk and mitigate the 
consequences of an attack.”126  Galway says that risk analysis is the process of assessing 
risks, while risk management “uses risk analysis to devise management strategies to 
reduce or ameliorate risk.”127    
The GAO advocates the use of a risk management approach that includes three 
primary elements:  threat assessment, vulnerability assessment, and criticality 
assessment.128  (See Figure 2).  This section will address the FBI’s current approach to 
special events management through an analysis of each of these elements, and will 
identify potential areas for improvement using this systematic framework. 
 
Figure 2.   GAO’s three primary elements of risk management129                                                    
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a. Threat Assessment 
The FBI currently uses threat assessments to assist with some resource 
allocation decisions regarding special events.  Individualized threat assessments are 
conducted for all SERL I-III events, but for all SERL IV events, planners rely upon a 
single, semi-annual nationwide threat assessment that is produced for all FBI offices.  For 
NSSEs and DHS SEHS Level I events, DHS collaborates with the FBI to produce an 
interagency threat assessment.  Because of the lack of standardization between SEHS and 
SERL Level I events, there may be some confusion about who is ultimately responsible 
for producing the threat assessments for some of the most significant special events.  
Differences in interagency approval processes, different timelines, and the absence of 
clear guidelines for what should be included in threat assessments leaves room for 
improvement in the current threat assessment process.  The Congressional Research 
Service contends: 
To be helpful in assessing vulnerability and risk, threats need to be 
characterized in some detail.  Important characteristics include type (e.g. 
insider, terrorist, military), or environmental (e.g., hurricane, tornado)); 
intent or motivation; triggers (i.e., events that might initiate an attack); 
capability (e.g. skills, specific knowledge, access to materials or 
equipment); methods (e.g., use of individual suicide bombers, truck 
bombs, assault, cyber): and trends (what techniques have groups used in 
the past or have experimented with, etc.).130   
Ideally, threat assessments for the most significant special events should 
include full-spectrum, all-hazards threat information from a variety of sources known to 
the DHS, the FBI, and other potential sources.  One of the ways to ensure a 
comprehensive threat assessment is to include strategic information from national 
intelligence and information sources as well as tactical information from the affected 
state and local agencies.  This can be accomplished by ensuring that FBI Field 
Intelligence Groups (FIGs) and state fusion centers are included in the threat assessment 
process. 
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FIGs are interagency intelligence working groups that are centralized 
within FBI field offices.  They are responsible for the management, execution, and 
coordination of law enforcement intelligence functions.  Many states have established 
fusion centers in an effort to centralize homeland security intelligence and information 
from a variety of sources including law enforcement, military, fire, weather, public health 
and emergency management.  Building formal and informal relationships between these 
entities in advance of any special event is an ideal way to ensure that all actual and 
potential threats are adequately assessed.   
The FBI currently uses a formal threat assessment process to determine 
whether any communicated threat is credible.  This process includes evaluating the threat 
based on three criteria:  operational practicality, technical feasibility, and behavioral 
resolve.  When used to evaluate the threatened use of a weapon of mass destruction, for 
instance, the formal process includes a coordinated interagency threat assessment that 
evaluates not only the source of the threat but also whether the person or persons making 
the threat has the education, raw materials, production equipment, ability to distribute, 
and the motivation to carry out the threat.  Extending the interagency threat assessment 
process to the evaluation of threats received prior to or during special events is consistent 
with the risk management approach.  It should be formally adopted by special events 
planners.  
By identifying and assessing threats, organizations do not have to rely on 
worst-case scenarios to guide planning and resource allocations.  Worst case scenarios 
tend to focus on vulnerabilities, which are virtually unlimited, and would require 
extraordinary resources to address.131  In the absence of any detailed threat information, 
special event planners must balance their knowledge of general threats with information 
about known and suspected vulnerabilities as well as information about the criticality of 
the targets to be protected.  
b. Vulnerability Assessment 
A vulnerability assessment is a process that identifies weaknesses in 
physical structures, personnel protection systems, processes or other areas that may be 
exploited by terrorists and may suggest options to eliminate or mitigate those  
131 Moteff, CRS-3. 
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weaknesses.132  Tailored vulnerability assessments, including tactical site surveys, have 
long been a part of the FBI approach to special events management.  The tactical site 
survey program was designed to manage the evaluation of physical sites for security 
threats and vulnerabilities, and these assessments have traditionally focused on the type 
of information tactical personnel require for crisis management decision making.  The 
“all-hazards” approach to special event planning requires an approach to vulnerability 
assessment that goes beyond the traditional requirements of FBI special event planners.  
The new approach must recognize the physical, social, political, economic, cultural, and 
psychological harms to which individuals and modern societies are susceptible.133  They 
should include a physical evaluation of the venue sites, but must also include an 
assessment of the anticipated participants and spectators; an understanding of supporting 
critical infrastructure; an assessment of the capabilities of state and local law 
enforcement, fire/rescue, and emergency medical services personnel; and an 
understanding of the assets and capabilities of all partners in the special events planning 
process.  A worksheet recently developed by the FBI SEMU for use in collecting 
information during this assessment is attached at Appendix C.  Vulnerability analysis 
should include not only addressing the items described above, it should also include 
exercises designed to test for further vulnerabilities.  Comprehensive analysis that 
includes reviewing lessons learned during exercises and operations will help identify 
gaps that can be further assessed, prioritized, and filled.   
Integration and networking are essential to the vulnerability assessment 
process.  DHS has responsibility for the national critical infrastructure protection 
program, and they administer this program through the Protective Services Division 
(PSD) of the Infrastructure Protection Directorate.  PSD has developed a robust 
vulnerabilities assessment tool that is useful for critical infrastructure vulnerability 
analysis and that may be adopted for use in special events planning.  The Buffer Zone 
Protection Program (BZPP) was originally designed for use “outside the fence line” of 
 
132 Moteff, CRS-3. 5. 
133 Kunreuther, Risk Analysis and Risk Management in an Uncertain World, 18. 
53 
                                                
critical infrastructure targets, but it includes a comprehensive systems analysis approach 
that could benefit special events planners.  The objectives of the BZPP are as follows:134
• Identify and/or enhance the existing procedures to prevent a terrorist 
incident at critical infrastructure/key asset facilities in the United States. 
• Determine lines of communication and coordination among facilities, 
local, state, tribal, and federal responders. 
• Conduct a gap analysis of state and local first preventers regarding 
equipment, staffing and training.  And, 
• Identify and recommend solutions to any challenges or issues regarding 
prevention and protective measures.  
The BZPP objectives are consistent with what is required for special 
events planning.  The BZPP includes an analysis of physical structures and other system 
components using the CARVER-Shock assessment methodology.  This methodology 
provides a structured framework for documenting expert opinion about a system.  The 
method is based on assigning a numerical value for each of a set of attributes used to 
describe the various complexes, components, and “nodes” of the system.  Under the 
CARVER concept, ‘system’ includes the physical facilities, the commodity involved, the 
production processes, and the human aspects.135  This type of integrated objective and 
subjective analysis using a structured framework is useful for understanding the complex 
systems in play during special events.  It leverages the strengths of complementary FBI 
and DHS programs in a comprehensive approach to vulnerability assessment for special 
events – an important component of the overall risk management strategy. 
c. Criticality Assessment 
A criticality assessment is a process designed to systematically identify 
and evaluate important assets and infrastructure in terms of various factors, such as the 
mission and significance of a target.136  Criticality is typically defined as a measure of the 
consequences associated with the loss or degradation of a particular asset.  The more the 
loss of an asset threatens the survival of those who depend on it (including the nation as a 
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whole), the more critical it becomes.137  Criticality assessments at special events are 
important for a couple of reasons.  At a tactical level, assessing all venue areas at a given 
special event is important to identify those areas of the event that are most significant or 
require the most resources.  At a strategic level, assessing upcoming events to determine 
which are the most critical will assist with resource allocation decisions.   
The criticality assessment is key to the sustainability of the special events 
management program.  Without tools to determine which special events may be 
adequately supported by state and local officials and which events require the assistance 
of federal resources, the FBI and other federal agencies will be unable to effectively and 
efficiently deploy counterterrorism assets in support of special events.    
Aside from the SERL rating system, the FBI does not currently use a 
criticality assessment to determine where to best allocate resources.  This results in over-
resourcing some events and under-resourcing others.  Criticality analysis requires a risk-
based needs assessment because not every event needs the same level of protection.  A 
way to improve the criticality assessment process may be found through the reevaluation 
of the SERL and SEHS rating systems.  An accurate SERL rating would adequately 
reflect the FBI’s assessment of the criticality of an event.  If the SERL rating were then 
linked to a baseline set of capabilities, such as some of those identified in the DHS Target 
Capabilities List, it would provide better guidance to both FBI and interagency special 
events planners and would clearly identify what resources could be expected from the 
FBI for different special events.  This is discussed further in Appendix B.   
The restructuring of the SERL system into a more meaningful capabilities-
based assessment tool would not only improve the ability of the FBI to make resource 
allocation decisions, it would also go a long way toward meeting the requirements of 
HSPD-8 and the National Preparedness Goal.138  The pursuit of this goal is important to 
the improvement of interagency preparedness and it will benefit special events as well as 
other potential incidents and emergencies.   
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A risk analysis approach that includes the tenets of threat assessment, 
vulnerability assessment, and criticality assessment will improve the objectivity of the 
FBI special events management system and will allow FBI personnel to make more 
appropriate and informed resource allocation decisions in support of special events.  
Employment of a standardized methodology will allow FBI special event planners to 
articulate what criteria it uses to select events of national importance, the basic strategy it 
uses to determine which events warrant additional protective measures, and by how much 
these measures could reduce the risk to the nation.139
3. Risk as Politics 
Where risk as feelings and risk as analysis clash, risk as politics emerges.  
Members of the public and experts can disagree about risk because they define risk 
differently, have different worldviews, different affective experiences and reactions, or 
different social status.140  Special events are inherently political.  Political leaders, private 
and public influence-peddlers, business leaders and the media all have interests at stake in 
the management of special events.  Additionally, the impact of interagency organizational 
politics cannot be discounted.  An understanding of risk as politics allows special events 
planners to create strategies that leverage the influence of power and politics to their 
advantage.  
In a recent article for Global Security Newswire it was reported that some key 
liberal thinkers in the U.S. believe that current U.S. antiterrorism policy keeps the 
populace in fear for political gain.  John Tirman, the executive director of the MIT Center 
for International Studies was quoted as saying “…the ideology of homeland 
security...[creates] fear and anxiety” that boosts support for the war abroad.  The Director 
of the Columbia University Earth Institute agreed that the U.S. populace is kept in fear 
and argued that if the public was better informed it would be less inclined to support 
military action as the primary response to the terrorist threat.141  These comments 
acknowledge the role that politics plays in risk and the perception of risk, but they are 
focused on the negative aspects of risk as politics.  
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Politics can also serve a positive, functional role for special events planners.  
Politics can be helpful in overcoming weak leaders by ensuring that the strongest 
members of an organization (or coalition) are brought into positions of leadership.  
Politics can provide alternate channels of information and promotion and good leaders in 
less influential organizations can leap over poor leaders in more influential agencies or 
departments.142  This can work to the benefit of an interagency plan to secure or manage 
a special event.  An influential interagency leader who can effectively manage risk as 
feelings, for example, may be able to convince those with a disproportionate fear of 
attack to reconsider their resource allocation strategies. 
Politics can also ensure that all sides of an issue are fully debated.  It obliges 
people to fight for their preferred ideas, encouraging a variety of voices to be heard on 
any issue.  “And because of attacks by opponents, each voice, no matter how self-serving, 
is forced to justify its conclusions in terms of the broader good – the interests of the 
organization at large.”143  Finally, politics may be required to stimulate change that is 
blocked by “more legitimate systems of influence…” and it can ease the path for the 
execution of that change.  “Senior managers, for example, often use politics to gain 
acceptance for their decisions by building alliances to smooth their path.”144
Understanding the political dimension of risk is important to the overall risk 
management strategy.  Politics is only one component of the strategy, however, and the 
overall approach must be balanced with an understanding of risk as feelings and risk as 
analysis.  Through the balanced application of risk management principles that includes 
objective and subjective inputs, political sensitivities may be respected and legitimately 
used, but political influence can be minimized. 
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VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Special events are a microcosm of the world of homeland security.  Effective 
special events management requires the elimination of duplication and overlap in favor of 
integration and synergy.  DHS has moved quickly in its attempts to meet the goals set 
forth by President Bush to:  “increase the capacity of the United States to prevent attacks 
within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to terrorism; and minimize the 
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.”145  In doing so, however, DHS has 
created some programs and processes that have resulted in duplication of effort and 
contributed to confusion among local, state, and federal agencies.  Ironically, this may 
have negatively impacted counterterrorism preparedness at major special events.  The 
following recommendations are offered in an attempt to address this problem: 
A. FOCUS ON LEADERSHIP 
• It is proposed and recommended that the FBI assume a more active 
leadership role in managing major special events. 
The FBI is ideally positioned to provide federal leadership in special events 
management by virtue of its statutory and executive authorities and mandates.  The focus 
of special events management is currently on counterterrorism and the maintenance of 
public order and as such, special events are treated by state and local authorities as law 
enforcement problems.  Legacy Presidential Decision Directives and Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 5 (HSPD-5) empower the FBI to coordinate the activities of other 
law enforcement agencies charged with managing counterterrorism activities at special 
events.  As the primary federal agency charged with both criminal and terrorism 
investigations, the FBI can leverage its unique authorities to engage in all aspects of 
special events coverage from planning and prevention activities to detection, deterrence 
and response.  This is true whether or not the major special event is designated as a 
National Special Security Event.  Additionally, the FBI has responsibilities, authorities, 
and resources that permit it to act globally.  Regardless of whether the FBI is engaged in 
domestic events planning with the Department of Homeland Security or international  
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events planning with the Departments of State and Defense, the FBI is positioned to 
provide consistency across the federal government’s special events management 
program. 
Beyond the formal authorities that permit it to act, the FBI has the legitimacy that 
leaves it well prepared to assume a leadership role within the special events management 
community.  Mintzberg, et al., describe legitimacy as a function of three systems:  formal 
authority, established culture, and certified expertise.146  As mentioned previously, the 
FBI has the appropriate authorities to act.  It also has been involved in counterterrorism 
planning and special events management for over a decade, and a formal special events 
management unit has existed since 1996.  The management of special events is an 
accepted part of the FBI’s counterterrorism program.  Finally, the FBI has consistently 
demonstrated subject matter expertise in many of the areas required for effective special 
events management (i.e. tactical planning, intelligence, hazardous materials response, and 
crisis management).  In fact, the FBI special events system has served as a model to DHS 
and the interagency community.  For these reasons, the FBI can and should assume a 
more proactive leadership role in counterterrorism and law enforcement planning for 
special events. 
To demonstrate its leadership in special events, the FBI should consider the 
following: 
• Ensure the Special Agent in Charge (SAC) of the affected field 
division is personally and visibly involved in both the planning and 
operational aspects of major special events.   
This is essential to emphasize the importance the FBI places on counterterrorism 
planning and it provides confirmation to interagency partners that the FBI takes its 
leadership role seriously.  This will also reinforce within the special events management 
community that the reason the FBI is involved in special events management is consistent 
with, and in furtherance of, the FBI’s authorities and mandates.  The tone set by the SAC 
is important to the FBI field division as well as to interagency partners.  A demonstrated 
commitment to counterterrorism preparedness confirms that the SAC has embraced the  
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concept of terrorism prevention (proactive measures) over prosecution (reactive 
response).  This is consistent with the new paradigm for operations in the post-September 
11th world of homeland security. 
The involvement of the SAC is also critical to ensure that events resourced by the 
FBI truly merit the allocation of planning and operational resources.  The SAC serves as 
the “front line” in screening requests from other local, state and federal departments and 
agencies seeking FBI assistance.  Use of the decision matrix and the planning worksheet 
may assist the FBI SAC in determining if the assets of the local field division can and 
should be used to support a proposed special event.  Once the SAC determines that an 
event merits FBI resources, the rating system may be used to determine the level of 
support that is warranted.      
• Approach special events as opportunities rather than burdens. 
Often special events are seen as a burden to the law enforcement agencies charged 
with planning and operational response.  Special events should instead be seen as 
opportunities and they should be embraced.  Unlike exercises, in which many of the 
activities are either artificial or “notional,” special events involve real-world scenarios 
with deployed personnel.  They are essentially scheduled opportunities to practice real-
world operational response; identify critical resource and training shortfalls; practice 
integration; exercise command and control; interact with the media and test media 
strategies; test communications systems and capture lessons learned.  Special events 
should be used to practice the interagency interoperability skills that will be essential to 
any mutual aid response in a real-world crisis.  As such, planning should be taken 
seriously and resources should be prepared in advance of special events in the same way 
they would be if they were to be deployed in response to a critical incident. 
• Reorganize to more effectively manage special events.   
The Special Events Management Unit (SEMU) and the Crisis Management Unit 
(CMU) currently conduct parallel planning for the same special events.  Co-locating 
CMU and SEMU within the Critical Incident Response Group (CIRG) would ensure a 
more coordinated and comprehensive process for planning the FBI response to special 
events.  If the units were managed from within the same operational division, specific 
roles and responsibilities could be more clearly defined and parallel planning processes 
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could be more easily identified and eliminated.  SEMU would have responsibility for 
coordinating administrative, logistical and operational planning for scheduled special 
events; CMU would have responsibility for coordinating contingency planning, exercises 
and training, interagency integration, and operational response to critical incidents that 
arise during scheduled special events. 
• Recast the role of FBI Headquarters special events planners to expand 
their oversight and operational role in special events.   
Currently, the lead responsibility for special events planning rests with field-based 
planners.  While this focus is important, restructuring the special events program to 
expand the oversight and operational role of headquarters planners will improve the 
ability of headquarters planners to exercise their assigned program management 
responsibilities.  Empowering headquarters personnel and increasing their visibility in 
operational planning will give them the insight and the legitimacy necessary to 
effectively address the national strategic issues that impact field operations. 
Centralization of special event planning at the national level would increase 
consistency.  It would ensure that the expertise gained in one geographic location would 
be transferred to other areas for future events.  It would also ensure that events with the 
same SERL rating would be resourced similarly regardless of their location or the 
resources of the hosting field division.  Formalizing headquarters input into local field 
planning efforts through appropriate process changes may also provide the national 
perspective necessary to balance local pressure to resource special events that may not 
otherwise warrant the use of FBI assets or personnel. 
• Adopt a risk management approach to special events management.   
Risks can be reduced in a number of ways:  by reducing threats, by reducing 
vulnerabilities, or by reducing the impact or consequences.147  By using standardized 
measurement criteria to determine the threats, vulnerabilities, and criticality of certain 
events, the FBI can make more effective choices about how it allocates its resources.  
Using objective tools such as the event rating level decision matrix, the planning 
worksheet, and rating criteria ratified by interagency partners, the FBI will be able to 
establish and reinforce decision-making protocols that can be used by other law 
 
147 Moteff, CRS-10. 
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enforcement and homeland security agencies.  These protocols will allow FBI planners to 
articulate the criteria it uses to select events of national importance, the basic strategy it 
uses to determine which events warrant additional protective measures, and by how much 
these measures could reduce the risk to the nation.148  This process will ensure that the 
FBI special events management program is rational, politically defensible, and fiscally 
responsible.  
B. FOCUS ON THE GRAND STRATEGY 
Several additional recommendations are related to the FBI’s external relationships 
with other stakeholders.  The following recommendations are aimed at improving 
interagency aspects of the FBI’s approach to special events management.  They are 
consistent with the three tenets of Cronin’s grand strategy: integrate, network, and 
balance.  
1. Integrate 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) states that the Secretary of 
Homeland Security is responsible for coordinating the overall national effort to identify, 
prioritize, and protect critical infrastructures and key resources, including significant 
special events.149  This Directive assigned Sector Specific Agencies the responsibility of 
conducting or facilitating vulnerability assessments of their sector, and encouraging the 
use of risk assessment strategies to protect against or mitigate the effects of attacks 
against critical infrastructures or key resources.150  The Sector Specific Agency approach 
works well for determining who is responsible for protecting nuclear facilities, chemical 
plants, power plants and other physical structures, but no Sector Specific Agency has 
been identified as having lead responsibility for special events management.   
Clear definition of the responsibilities of DHS and the FBI with respect to special 
events management will allow each agency to leverage off the strengths of the other.  
Effective counterterrorism preparedness efforts in the post-September 11th world will 
require both the law enforcement authorities and experience of the FBI and the 
coordination mandates and abilities of DHS.  This requires that the FBI be more flexible 
 
148 Moteff, CRS-22. 
149 President Bush, HSPD-7. 
150 Moteff, CRS-3. 
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and open to accepting some of the changes offered by DHS but also requires that DHS 
respect the legitimacy of the FBI’s traditional terrorism missions, including the 
management of special events. 
• It is proposed and recommended that the position of Federal 
Coordinator (FC) be eliminated. 
The FBI Special Agent in Charge has historically been responsible for 
coordination of federal law enforcement and counterterrorism efforts with state and local 
law enforcement leaders – and the SAC will be held accountable for this responsibility.  
The authority and responsibility vested in the SAC is not discretionary, and it remains 
unchanged despite the designation of a Federal Coordinator.  With the appointment of the 
DHS FC, (defined by DHS as the principal federal point of contact), it has become less 
clear to local, state and other federal officials with whom they should coordinate their 
requests for federal support for special events.  It is now possible for information that 
previously would have been provided to the FBI SAC to be passed instead to the FC – 
who may or may not have control of operational assets and who may or may not be aware 
of the planning and operational response capabilities of the FBI field office.  It is 
important to note that FCs are only appointed for SEHS Level I and II events, so state and 
local partners accustomed to dealing with the FBI SAC for the more common SEHS 
Level III and IV events may be especially susceptible to confusion regarding the federal 
special events support process.   
DHS-appointed Federal Resource Coordinators (as defined in the National 
Response Plan) or Protective Security Advisors (PSAs) can assist the FBI SAC with 
overall counterterrorism planning efforts by coordinating the efforts of non-law 
enforcement agencies responsible for managing special events.  For special events that do 
not involve the FBI, FRCs and PSAs can take a more active law enforcement 
coordination role if it is necessary.  Elimination of the FC position will ensure that the 
efforts of response and recovery assets and law enforcement assets are coordinated, but 





                                                
• It is proposed and recommended that the FBI adopt the standards set 
forth in the National Preparedness Goal and structure its processes to 
be consistent with the DHS standard. 
HSPD-8 requires that all terrorism preparedness activities work toward the same 
overall National Preparedness Goal.151  DHS has created the National Preparedness 
System to achieve that goal.  It is important that the FBI immediately and fully adopt the 
standards set forth in the National Preparedness System to demonstrate that it has 
accepted DHS as a full partner in the security of the homeland, and to ensure consistency 
in preparedness activity throughout federal counterterrorism preparedness programs.   
By incorporating the language and principles set forth in the National Response 
Plan (NRP) and structuring operational response elements in accordance with the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS), the FBI will reinforce its place as a 
legitimate leader in the law enforcement and homeland security community.  By 
partnering with DHS to implement the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, improve 
regional collaboration, and further define the Target Capabilities List (TCL)152 and the 
Universal Task List (UCL), the FBI will demonstrate its support for a common approach 
to national preparedness.  This will show progress toward the overarching priorities 
identified in the DHS National Preparedness Guidance – priorities that have been 
identified based on their relevance to national strategic objectives and their utility in 
terms of high payoff contributions to national readiness.153  The national approach to 
preparedness is essential in the post-September 11th world of homeland security.  The 
graphic on the following page depicts HSPD-8 in context: 
 
151 President Bush,  HSPD-8. 
152 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Target Capabilities List: Version 1.1, Office of State and 
Local Government Coordination and Preparedness (Washington, D.C., May 23, 2005). 
153 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Preparedness Guidance:  Homeland Security 
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Figure 3.   HSPD-8 in Context154 
 
The FBI strategy for special events management should endorse the capabilities-
based planning approach that is mandated by HSPD-8 and articulated in the National 
Preparedness Goal.  The FBI should engage in special event planning with an eye toward 
building the capability of each field office to manage the majority of special events.  The 
mission of SEMU should be to tackle the major issues that are inhibiting effective field 
planning and to provide subject matter expertise and coordination for the major special 
events that are beyond the scope of the “baseline” capabilities of individual field 
divisions.  This will ensure program consistency while at the same time allowing local 
planners the flexibility to adapt to local concerns. 
• It is proposed and recommended that the parallel SERL and SEHS 
rating systems be eliminated and that a single U.S. government special 
events rating system be adopted. 
Arrival at a single interagency Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) system 
that is developed collaboratively by the FBI and DHS and ratified by the Interagency 
Special Events Working Group would eliminate the confusion and duplication of effort 
that currently exists.  Based on criteria and thresholds similar to that set forth in 
64 
                                                 
154 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Interim National Preparedness Goal:  Homeland Security 
Presidential Directive 8:  National Preparedness (Washington, D.C., March 31, 2005), 2. 
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Appendix B, the ratings would be objective and repeatable, which makes them both 
rational and politically defensible.  Consolidation of the parallel rating systems would 
have an effect on the interagency special events management community consistent with 
what Cronin calls “a meaningful reform of the status quo that does not necessitate 
wholesale organizational restructuring but that could nonetheless alleviate some of the 
dysfunctionalities arising from cultural conflicts and institutional rivalries.”155   
Although the SEAR levels should not be tied directly to specific federal funding, 
they could be tied to capabilities-based planning and the National Preparedness Goal 
created under HSPD-8.  SEAR levels could be linked to specific priority capabilities from 
the TCL that have been identified as necessary for preparedness, including strengthened 
information sharing and collaboration; interoperable communications; improved 
chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and explosives (CBRNE) detection, response, 
and decontamination; and increased medical surge and mass prophylaxis capabilities.156  
In this way, local, state and federal agencies could articulate the gaps in their capabilities 
for managing significant special events.  They could then seek additional federal grant 
funding or resources geared toward improving identified shortfalls.  This process would 
allow agencies to increase their capacity to manage major special events while at the 
same time improve their overall preparedness posture.  
• It is proposed and recommended that FBI assets be fully integrated 
with other local, state, and federal assets during special events.   
A coordinated law enforcement effort is necessary to ensure a consistent and 
effective nationwide approach to special events management.  Under the leadership of the 
FBI SAC, the integration of FBI assets with state and local law enforcement assets on 
teams responsible for all aspects of event coverage, including planning, surveillance, 
intelligence, identification, interview, and prosecution will provide a range of capabilities 
that will increase the effectiveness of all agencies involved in managing special events.  
The coordination of this integration under the FBI SAC is consistent with the 
responsibility of the FBI to coordinate the activities of other members of the law 
enforcement community to detect, prevent, preempt, and disrupt terrorist attacks against 
 
155 Blaise Cronin, “Intelligence, Terrorism, and National Security,” Annual Review of Information 
Science and Technology 29 (2005), 415. 
156 U.S. DHS, National Preparedness Guidance, 15. 
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the United States.  Once law enforcement efforts are coordinated by the FBI, DHS may 
coordinate the overall special event response by synthesizing the efforts of law 
enforcement with those of the response and recovery community.  This may be 
accomplished by the DHS Federal Resource Coordinator (FRC), a position formally 
identified in the National Response Plan and recognized by members of the interagency.  
Specific operational integration strategies that may be useful for managing politically 
charged special events are addressed in Appendix D.  
2. Network 
The management of special events should be accomplished through an 
interagency collaborative planning approach, not a series of independent, sequential 
planning efforts.  The U.S. Government approach currently involves separate (and 
independent) inputs into an overall plan to support special events.  This results in a 
segmented product with no clear policies or standards for integration.  There is little 
consensus on common goals and objectives.  “With the rapid rise of cooperative 
relationships, strategy formulation leaves the exclusive confines of the single 
organization and becomes instead a joint process, to be developed with partners.”157  A 
network approach is essential to come up with a collective strategy. 
• It is proposed and recommended that the agencies consider an 
interagency exchange of special events planners between DHS and the 
FBI. 
Cronin opines “specific remedial steps that fall far short of wholesale structural 
reorganization might include concrete reforms aimed at reducing both intra- and 
interagency rivalry and segmentalism (to use Rosabeth Moss Kanter’s [1983] term) such 
as the mixing and rotation of staff members from one agency to another – a practice not 
without precedence in the U.S. Intelligence community..”158  Defense department 
planners have identified this as a valuable component of the overall strategy to defeat 
terrorist insurgency, and it may prove equally as valuable to special events management.  
In particular, the U.S. must be able to: 
• Train personnel in a genuine interagency environment.  From the 
classroom to daily operations to interagency training exercises, personnel 
must think and act as part of a network rather than a hierarchy. 
 
157 Mintzberg, Ahlstrand, and Lampel, 255. 
158 Cronin, 416. 
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• Develop personnel through the equivalent of military joint tours.  As in the 
military, these tours must be an essential step for promotion… 
• Operate as interagency elements down to the tactical level.  This means 
abandoning the agency-specific stovepipes that link operations…to their 
U.S. headquarters.…Personnel must be trained to be effective linking into 
the interagency process, and those who do should be rewarded.  The 
current process of rewarding those who do work entirely within a specific 
agency prevents effective networking.159 
3. Balance 
Different agencies have different core competencies and these must be fully 
developed for success in the post-September 11th world.  Not every agency has to do 
everything – it is important that each understand its role in the overall counterterrorism 
preparedness mission.  According to the FBI Strategic Plan: 
The FBI’s counterterrorism successes to date have been largely 
determined by its flexibility, leadership, and collaboration with the U.S. 
Intelligence Community and its foreign and domestic law enforcement 
partners.  Since 9/11, the FBI has:  (1) shifted its counterterrorism culture 
and organization from reactive to proactive and “threat-based”; (2) 
developed a nationally-driven, fully integrated Intelligence and 
Investigative Program; (3) improved information sharing with other 
federal agencies, state and local governments, and international 
counterterrorism partners; (4) enhanced operational capabilities within 
FBI Headquarters and the field; and (5) evaluated lessons learned to better 
equip the nation in preventing terrorism. The FBI will continue to work 
closely with its intelligence and law enforcement partners focusing on full 
disruption of terrorist operations. 
We will also continue ongoing efforts to shift our international operations 
from simple liaison to dynamic operational partnerships with host country 
law enforcement and intelligence counterparts. Domestically, the FBI will 
continue to work closely with Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
and community stakeholders in the counterterrorism preparedness arena 
— to protect the nation’s critical infrastructure from attack; to protect 
major special events that present an operational opportunity for terrorists; 
to prepare against the use of WMD materiel and technology within the 
United States; and to focus on traditional domestic terrorism groups 
planning criminal acts in attempts to effect political change. 160
 
159 Thomas X. Hammes, “Insurgency:  Modern Warfare Evolves into a Fourth Generation,” Strategic 
Forum 214, (January 2005), 7. 
160 FBI Strategic Plan 2004-2009, 26. 
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The FBI, DHS, and a number of other departments and agencies all have 
responsibilities for counterterrorism preparedness and response.  Special event planning 
in the post-September 11th world of homeland security does not require separate lanes of 
responsibility, it requires synergy of effort.  Competition and dysfunction must be 
replaced with consensus and focus.  This can only be accomplished, however, through 
legitimate leadership, appropriate accountability, and unity of effort.  The FBI has 
criminal and counterterrorism mandates and authorities that make it uniquely capable of 
providing leadership to the law enforcement community.  DHS has mandates and 
authorities that make it uniquely capable of coordinating the efforts of law enforcement 
with those of response and recovery operations.  The FBI must avoid trying to expand to 
meet the mandates of DHS and should instead focus on its core competencies.  DHS 
headquarters must avoid the temptation to replicate the activities of either law 
enforcement or response and recovery agencies and should instead focus on its 
coordination role.  Collaboration could then become genuine as the organizations develop 
orientations that gradually eliminate competitive antagonism.161
C. OPPORTUNITIES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH  
As Homeland Security continues to emerge as an academic discipline, the area of 
special events management may be considered ripe for additional exploration.  Little has 
been offered in the way of performance metrics to determine the success of special events 
planning.  What constitutes success and how can we best determine if we have achieved 
it?  No testing or validation of the tools offered here has yet occurred, and there is still 
little standardization in the way special events planners are selected and trained.  Finally, 
technology solutions for different special events challenges are largely unexplored, 
including tools for situational awareness and the development of a common operating 
picture.  While it is clear that interoperability is essential to success in special events 
management, the challenge lies in fully defining the players and achieving the 
appropriate balance among them.  
D. CONCLUSION 
This thesis has identified a number of issues that require resolution if the FBI’s 
current approach to special events management is to improve.  Changes to the status quo, 
 
161 Mintzberg, Ahlstrand and Lampel, 256. 
69 
mission expansion, and the increasing cost of allocating resources for special events 
requires that the FBI reevaluate its special events management program.  This paper used 
several strategic planning principles to assess the FBI’s current approach to special events 
management.  It examined the subjective and objective components of the system used by 
the FBI and DHS to categorize and resource special events, and it concluded that the 
current approach is not sufficient for the post-September 11th world.  The allocation of 
resources in support of special events requires a system that is rational, politically 
defensible, and fiscally responsible.  A new system based on the application of risk 
management principles would meet these criteria. 
The FBI currently engages in some aspects of risk analysis and risk management, 
but it has not yet formalized this process for special events management.  A standardized 
methodology that includes an understanding of risk as feelings, risk as analysis, and risk 
as politics is useful for effectively managing special events.  Through an integrated 
interagency approach that emphasizes building networks and balancing subjective and 
objective influences, the FBI can create a long-term, sustainable, strategic approach for 
















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
71 
                                                
APPENDIX A: SWOC ANALYSIS 
A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges (SWOC) analysis of the 
FBI Special Events Management Unit (SEMU) was conducted to identify the external 
and internal issues related to SEMU’s mission.  This analysis was conducted as a part of 
an overall reevaluation of the FBI’s approach to Special Events management in the post-
9/11 world.  Consistent with the framework identified by Bryson, four questions were 
addressed during the SWOC analysis.162  The questions and the results of the SWOC 
analysis are listed below:   
What major external or future opportunities are available to the FBI? 
• Changes in DHS leadership may leave the FBI better 
positioned to influence the direction of the interagency 
Special Events management community.  Michael Chertoff, 
Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, 
recently declared, “This is a marathon, not a sprint…we 
must lay out a vision of homeland security is sustainable 
over the long run.”163  He has mandated a review of DHS 
programs and initiatives to identify and eliminate areas of 
overlap, ineffectiveness and inefficiency. 
• There is a lull in scheduled major events this year, allowing 
time for the completion of major projects (i.e. completion 
of the update to the Special Events management handbook; 
increased communication and liaison with FBI field 
offices; better collaboration with interagency partners). 
• There has been more focus on special events management, 
especially as it relates to counterterrorism, since 9/11 (there 
is a need for a community of experts) 
• The FBI has long had a rating system in place that provides 
a guideline for how to respond to and resource special 
events (Special Event Readiness Level (SERL) system).  
This historical reference is valuable to the interagency 
community (especially DHS) as it develops a similar 
system for allocating resources in support of special events. 
• HSPD-8 requires that agencies engage in capabilities-based 
planning.164  This requirement affords SEMU an 
 
162 Ibid., 141. 
163 Michael Chertoff, Remarks for Secretary Michael Chertoff, U.S. Department of Homeland 
Security, George Washington University Homeland Security Policy Institute, (Washington, D.C., March 16, 
2005) at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?theme=44&content=4391 (accessed June 11, 2005). 
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opportunity to review its current strategies for FBI Special 
Events management to determine where/how SEMU can 
increase its effectiveness. 
 
What major external or future challenges are facing the FBI? 
• There has been no clear delineation of responsibilities (or 
authorities) of the agencies involved in planning and 
operational response during special events.  Consequently, 
FBI authorities may be perceived as being in conflict with 
the authorities and responsibilities of other agencies. 
• Agency policies are sometimes interpreted to have the same 
force of law as legislative authorities/mandates – this 
further confuses the lanes of responsibility. 
• If homeland security grants are coupled to SERL or Special 
Events Homeland Security (SEHS) rating systems, political 
pressure to rate events at levels higher than they warrant 
may artificially inflate the ratings.  This is fiscally 
dangerous. 
• As budget formulas are revised and reevaluated, agencies 
are increasingly being forced to compete for scarce 
resources.  Some agencies are expanding into homeland 
security and counterterrorism in an attempt to leverage 
more resources – even though they may have not 
historically held those missions.  At least some of that 
expansion has been into areas of special event management 
that have traditionally been part of the mission of the FBI.  
(Turf wars and rice bowls). 
• Current threats require a cultural shift on the part of the 
FBI.  Information sharing and inclusion must replace 
information collection and exclusion if current 
counterterrorism strategies are going to succeed. 
 
What are the FBI’s major internal or present strengths? 
• Many employees in SEMU have garnered a great deal of 
experience and expertise in special events management, 
especially within the past year. 
• New employees have demonstrated an interest in learning 
about special events management (they appear poised to 
take ownership in new programs). 
• Most of the new employees have strong operational 
backgrounds. 
• New leadership in the SEMU has significant background in 
liaison and interagency issues, and significant operational 
experience. 
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• The FBI has a large repository of information about lessons 
learned at special events – a huge library from which to 
draw upon to improve the way special events are managed. 
 
What are the FBI’s major internal or present weaknesses? 
• The Special Events program is managed within the 
Weapons of Mass Destruction/Domestic Terrorism 
Operations Section, and it is considered less important than 
some other programs in the Section.  
• The unit has acquired a reputation as a means of financial 
support, but not necessarily operational support. 
• There is lack of clarity on how SEMU contributes to the 
counterterrorism community. 
• There have been few attempts to exploit the information 
that exists in historical files to get a comprehensive picture 
of the past so that it can inform the future. 
• Despite significant institutional experience managing 
special events, no template has emerged that provides 
guidance to new special events planners about how to do 
“typical” events (i.e. large sporting events vs. politically 
charged special events). 
• FBI Special Events planning is decentralized and most 
events are planned by different field divisions “from the 
ground up” each time.  This may result in some resources 
being allocated based on political or subjective decisions.  
There exists a need for an objective analysis of which 
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APPENDIX B: EVENT RATING LEVEL DECISION MATRIX 
It is recognized that formal interagency reconciliation of the SERL and SEHS 
rating systems is necessary if a single U.S. government system for rating and resourcing 
special events is to be developed.  The following decision matrix is offered as a starting 
point for that discussion.  The matrix lists the definitions used by both the FBI and DHS 
for determining their special event rating levels. Threshold numbers were initially 
developed for SERL criteria only, and they were derived primarily based upon the 
author’s experience.  The values were then vetted by a small focus group comprised of 
FBI special events management experts and tested for validity against historical FBI 
SERL I, II, III, and IV special events cases.     
After the criteria were determined to be valid for the SERL rating system, 
additional criteria values were developed for the three additional SEHS criteria.  These 
values are offered as placeholders only.  No vetting or testing has been conducted on the 
criteria values for SEHS criteria because they may not be consistent with other rating 
systems that are currently being developed by DHS to evaluate critical infrastructure 
and/or domestic preparedness.  
The numbers assigned to each of the threshold levels in the matrix (in 
parentheses) do not correspond directly to SERL or SEHS rating levels.  They are simply 
values used to determine an overall numeric score.  The final SERL or SEHS rating is 
derived by dividing the overall score (sum of the criteria values) by the number of rating 
criteria values used (8 for SERL system and 11 for SEHS system).  The raw score is then 
converted to the corresponding SERL or SEHS level.  The results are as follows: 
Total score / 8 = Raw Score    Total score/11 = Raw Score  
Raw Score  SERL Level    Raw Score SEHS Level
 
0.0-2.5  SERL IV    0.0-2.5  SEHS IV   
2.5-3.0  SERL III    2.5-3.0  SEHS III   
3.0-3.5  SERL II    3.0-3.5  SEHS II   




SERL Rating System Criteria SEHS Rating System Criteria 
Size:  This includes the size of both the event 
and the responsible field office.  The greater the number 
of participants and associated staff, generally the greater 
the security and safety requirement.  Size of the field 
office is also an important consideration as larger 
offices may be able to absorb the resource requirements 
for supporting an event more readily than smaller 
offices. 
   






Size – FBI Field Office 
Large – 12 (1) 
Medium – 34 (2) 
Small – 10 (3) 
Legal Attache (LEGAT) (4) 
 
Size:  Factors include the size of the event, 
including multiplicity of jurisdictions involved and the 
number of participants and associated staff.  Larger events 
are more likely to draw attention of terrorists, or other 
criminals, seeking to cause mass casualties. 
 
 
Threat:  Relevant considerations include the 
state of global political affairs, current domestic and 
global terrorist activity levels, previous acts of terrorism 
or other violence associated with this event, threats 
associated with similar events, current threat directed 
toward this event or attendees, and the realistic degree 




No articulable threat (1) 
Homeland Security Code Yellow (2) 
General, but articulable threat (3) 
Specific threat (4) 
Threat:  Factors include current threats directed 
toward this event or attendees; current threats associated 
with similar events; current levels of domestic and global 
terrorist activity; previous terrorist incidents or acts of 
violence associated with the event or similar events; the 
threat assessment for terrorism and civil disturbance before, 
during, and after the event; and the state of global political 









Significance:  Some events have historical, 
political, and/or symbolic significance that heightens 









Significance:   The symbolic, political and/or 
historical significance of the event. 
 
 
Duration:  Longer events often require more 




1 day (1) 
2-3 days (2) 
Up to 7 days (3) 
7+ days (4) 
 
Duration:  The duration of the event. Events 
lasting for an extended period of time often require more 
resources than those of relatively short duration and they 




Location:  An event’s location may provide an 
attractive stage for a criminal or terrorist act.  Certain 
locations may require unique capabilities to ensure 
adequate event security.  The geographical dispersion of 
an event is also an important consideration when 






Urban Area Security Initiative (4) 
 
Location:  The location of the event may provide 
an attractive stage for a criminal or terrorist act.  This factor 
includes assessment of the capability of Federal, state, and 
local resources available to support the event.  If it is a 
recurring event, local agencies are more experienced.  
Certain locations may require unique capabilities to ensure 
adequate event security.  The geographical dispersion of an 
event is also an important consideration when determining 
resource requirements 
Attendance:  Major events may have a large 
number of spectators in a relatively confined space, 
providing an inviting target for various weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD).  Attendees may also include 
people from disparate cultural, political, and religious 
backgrounds, some of whom may have antagonistic 








Attendance:  The number and type of 
attendees/participants.  Major events may have a large 
number of spectators in a relatively confined space, 
providing an inviting target for terrorist attacks (i.e. WMD).  
Attendees may include people from disparate cultural, 
political, and religious backgrounds, some of whom may 
have antagonistic relationships. 
 
 
Media Coverage:  Live media coverage 
presents terrorists and other criminal elements with a 
lucrative forum for making a statement to a wide 
audience.  Events with national and/or international 
media attention, therefore, may provide a more 









Media coverage:  Focus of national and/or 
international media attention on the event.  Live media 
coverage presents terrorists and other criminal elements 
with a lucrative forum for making a statement to a wide 
audience.  Events with national and/or international media 
attention may provide a more attractive target than those 
with minimal coverage. 
 
Dignitaries:  Large events may draw 
numerous government officials and other dignitaries 
from around the nation and the world.  Domestic and 
international criminal elements may be attracted to these 
individuals because of who they are, what they 
represent, or merely because they are well. 
 
Dignitaries in Attendance 
None known (1) 
Mayor/Governor/Regional Celebrity (2) 
Foreign Minister/National Celebrity/Former Head of 
State (3) 
Current Head of State (4) 
Dignitaries:  Participation by high-level U.S. 
and/or foreign government officials.  Large events may 
draw numerous government officials and other dignitaries 
from around the nation and the world.  Domestic and 
international criminal elements may be attracted to 
government officials and dignitaries.  The number and rank 
of the attending officials may affect the assessment of the 





Not currently defined by the FBI. Federal sponsorship or participation:  Events with 
Federal presence may present an attractive target for terrorist 
acts.  Such events are also likely to be high profile and of 
national significance, therefore also attractive to terrorists.  
This includes consideration of both the level and complexity 
of Federal capabilities employed. 
 
Federal Sponsorship or Participation 
Federal participation – nominal (1)  
Federal participation – significant (2) 
Federal sponsorship – low profile (3) 
Federal sponsorship – high profile (4) 
Not currently defined by the FBI.  
 
Critical infrastructure:  Proximity of critical 
infrastructure.  The number, density, and vulnerability of 
critical infrastructure sites in proximity to the venue must be 
considered. 
 
Critical Infrastructure in Proximity 
Low vulnerability/low consequence (1) 
High vulnerability/low consequence (2) 
Low vulnerability/high consequence (3) 
High vuln. /high consequence (4) 
 
Not currently defined by the FBI. State and local capabilities:  Size and expertise of 
state and local police forces, other responders.  Adequacy of 
security capabilities at the state and local level.  Adequacy 
of other state and local resources.  Request by state or local 
agencies for Federal assistance. 
 
State and Local Capabilities 
Large - >500 sworn personnel (1) 
Medium - 100-500 sworn personnel (2) 
Small  - <100 sworn officers/personnel (3) 
No Capability - (4) 
 
Table 3. Special Event Rating Level Decision Matrix 
 
It is proposed and recommended that the parallel SERL and SEHS rating systems 
be eliminated and that a single U.S. government special events rating system be adopted.  
Arrival at a single interagency Special Event Assessment Rating (SEAR) system that is 
developed collaboratively by the FBI and DHS and ratified by the Interagency Special 
Events Working Group would eliminate the confusion and duplication of effort that 
currently exists.  Based on criteria and thresholds similar to those set forth above, the 
ratings would be objective and repeatable, which makes them both rational and politically 
defensible.   
This matrix presumes that an event planner has determined that the event 
potentially qualifies for federal assistance.  Historically the Special Agent in Charge of an 
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FBI field office determines if an event qualifies for FBI assistance, and he or she has the 
authority to designate an event as a SERL IV.  It is assumed that each federal agency 
using this decision matrix will conduct a basic inquiry to confirm that the agency has the 
authority and jurisdiction to provide the contemplated support.   
There is a subjective component to special event planning that does not lend itself 
to quantifiable analysis.  For that reason, this matrix is offered only as a guideline.  If 
aggravating or mitigating factors exist that cannot be measured adequately by the criteria 
in the matrix, the event should be evaluated by potential stakeholders via an appropriate 
interagency assessment forum such as the Special Events Working Group.    
Although the SEAR levels should not be tied directly to specific federal funding, 
they could be tied to capabilities-based planning and the National Preparedness Goal 
created under HSPD-8.  SEAR levels could be linked to specific capabilities from the 
DHS Target Capabilities List (TCL) identified as necessary for special event 
preparedness.  In this way, local, state and federal agencies could articulate the gaps in 
their capabilities for managing significant special events.  Agencies could then seek 
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APPENDIX C: FBI PRE-EVENT PLANNING WORKSHEET 
I. BACKGROUND INFORMATION 
 
Name of event:          
 
Date(s) of event:         
 
Number of  venues:         
 
(Note:  In this document, “venue” refers to a specific facility or location, and “site” refers to a city or State) 
 
Location of event (Primary Venue):       
 City:        State:      
 
Name of State Homeland Security Director (or designee):        
 




  Name:             
 
Title:             
 
Agency:            
 
Address:            
 
City:        State:       
 
Email Address:            
 
Phone Number:        Fax:        
 
Cellular Number:       
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II. LOGISTICAL  INFORMATION 
 
1. Name of event host organization:          
 
2. Type of organization hosting event: 
□  Government  □  Private (non-government) 
□  State/Local  □  National   □  International 
 
3. Type of event: □  Sporting □  Political □  Educational     □   Business 
   □  Cultural □  Other 
If other, please describe:            
 
4. Number of spectators anticipated:          
 
 Estimated number of participants:          
 
 Foreign countries expected to participate:         
 
 Estimated number of foreign participants:         
 
Press/Media (both print and broadcast):        
           
            
 
Dignitaries/VIPs (U.S. and foreign) accompanied by protective security details:   
 
Name of Dignitary/VIP 
Title or Function at 
Event 
Type of Security 
  
 
□  Federal      □ State/local      □ Private 
  
 
□  Federal      □ State/local      □ Private 
  
 
□  Federal      □ State/local      □ Private 
  
 
□  Federal      □ State/local      □ Private 
 
 
5. If the event has been held previously, provide the dates and locations:     
            
            
            






6. Are there secondary venues? □  yes        □  no     If yes, please list: 
 
(Note:  In this document, “venue” refers to a specific facility or location, and “site” refers to a city or State) 
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7. Is the event occurring at multiple sites?    □  yes     □  no If yes, please list:  
 










8.    Will the events at multiple sites run concurrently?    □  yes     □  no If yes, please list: 
 
 9. Are there any other events or circumstances occurring at the same time as this event that 
could draw upon similar   State and local law enforcement and public safety resources?     
□  yes     □  no        
 If yes, please describe:          
            
             
 
10.   Additional event and site information (if necessary):       
            
            






III. OPERATIONAL INFORMATION 
 
1. List all federal, state or local public safety agencies involved in planning (include State National 
Guard, if appropriate): 
 
Lead Name of Agency and Contact Person Type of Agency Estimated number of 
personnel involved in event 
□    
□    
□    
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□    
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
 
2. Will non-sworn personnel be involved in security for this event?    □  yes    □  no   If yes how 
many will be: 
 
a.  Private Security personnel:    b. Volunteer Security personnel:     
 
 c.  National Guard personnel:    d.  Other:        
 
If other, please describe:            
 
3. Has a request been submitted to conduct name checks for this event?  □  yes    □  no;   if so, 
 
 a.  Approximately how many names will be submitted for checks?       
 
b.  What types of checks have been requested?  (i.e., CIA, ICE, NCIC, ACS, etc.)    
            
            
             
 
4. What criteria have been established regarding credentialing for the event?     
            
            
             
 
5. List any committees that have been formed and the agencies and organizations represented on each, 
including the FBI: 
 
Name of Committee Agencies Represented 
   
 
 




Name of Committee Agencies Represented 
   
 
 
   
 
 
6. Have subcommittees been established to coordinate the following (X all that apply): 
 
□ Accreditation    □ HazMat/WMD 
□ After Action    □ Host Liaison 
□ Airspace Security   □ Intelligence 
□ Budget & Logistics   □ Interagency Communication 
□ Civil Disobedience   □ Legal 
□ Contingency Planning   □ Media Relations 
□ Consequence Management  □ Physical Security 
□ Crisis Management   □ Tactical Assets 
□ Cyber & Critical Infrastructure Security □ Transportation  
□ Executive Protection   □ Workforce Preparedness/Training  
□ Hazardous Devices   □ Crisis Negotiations  
 
 
7. What additional subcommittees have been established? 
 
















8. Have subcommittee mission statements, goals and timetables been established?  □  yes     □  no 
 
9. Are FBI representatives from the Field Office participating in subcommittees?  □  yes     □  no 
 If yes, provide the following: 
 
Name of Subcommittee FBI Representative 
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10. Will a Joint Operations Center (or similar interagency command post) be activated for this event? 
 □  yes     □  no 
 If yes, provide the location:           
 
11. Will a Joint Information Center (or similar public/media liaison center) be activated for this event? 
 □  yes     □  no 
 If yes, provide the location:           
 
12. Will an Intelligence Operations Center (or similar interagency intelligence center) be activated for 
this event? 
 □  yes     □  no 
If yes, provide the location:           
 
13. Will a Bomb Management Center (or similar interagency center) be activated for this event? 
 □  yes     □  no 
If yes, provide the location:           
 
14. Have any of the following training exercises directly related to this event already occurred or been 
scheduled to occur (X all that apply): 
  □  Tabletop exercise   
  If yes, provide date, location and participants:       
            
            
             
□  Joint Field Training Exercise   
If yes, provide date, location and participants:       
             
            
            
□  Other training (i.e., CPX, Crisis Management, NIMS/NRP, ICON)   
If yes, provide date, location and participants:       
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15. Do State and Local LE agencies have the resources and training necessary to respond to possible 
incidents of mass protest and civil disobedience? □  yes     □  no 
 
16. Discuss any other pertinent security information:        
            
            
             
 
III. TACTICAL INFORMATION AND COORDINATION 
 
 
Point of Contact (law enforcement official) for security issues: 
 
Name:             
 
Title:             
 
Agency:            
 
Address:            
 
City:        State:       
 
Email Address:            
 
Phone Number:       Fax:       
 
Cellular Number:      
 
1. Has an incident command system been adopted for this site?  □  yes     □  no 
 
2. Will the local emergency operations center, separate from the joint operations center, be activated? 
□  yes     □  no  If yes, provide the following information: 
 
a.  Describe the coordination relationship between the EOC and the JOC:   
            
            
             
 
b.  List Agencies or Emergency Support Functions (ESFs) that will be activated or on standby for 
this event: 
 




















3. List the approximate number of tactical personnel, i.e. SWAT, available from the jurisdictions 
(Local/State) that could be called upon to support the event: 
  







4.  List the approximate number of Crisis Negotiations personnel available from the jurisdictions 
(Local/State) that could be called upon to support the event? 
 







5.  Does the event jurisdiction have a hazardous materials response capability?   □  yes     □  no 
 
a.  List the agent detection and identification capabilities of the Team(s) (include response for 
chemical, biological and radiological/nuclear): 
 
Detection and Identification 
Capabilities 







b.  List the mass decontamination capabilities of the Team(s): 
 







c.  Are hospital facilities dependent upon local hazardous materials teams for their facility’s  












d. List all local hospitals and their proximity to the event: 
 











6. Does the event jurisdiction have an Improvised Explosive Device Disposal response capability?  
□  yes   □  no 
 a. Is the Render Safe Team accredited?  □  yes   □  no 
  If yes, how many certified technicians does the Render Safe Team have?     
 
 b. How many fully equipped Response Teams (minimum of 2 Bomb Techs) can the event 
jurisdiction  dispatch at the same times?       
 
 c. Can the Render Safe Team respond to a WMD incident in appropriate protective equipment  
(SRS-5 with SCBA)?  □  yes  □  no  
  If yes, how many personnel are trained at this level?       
d.     Does the Render Safe Team(s) have portable containment vessels? □  yes     □  no 
 If yes, how many?      
        e. Does the Render Safe Team(s) have portable X-ray machines? □  yes     □  no 
 If yes, how many?         
        f. Does the Render Safe Team(s) have a robotics capability?  □  yes     □  no 
 If yes, how many?       
 
7. List the number of certified bomb technicians  (State/Local) who could be called upon to support the 
event: 
 






8. List local teams or capabilities (HazMat, EMS, US&R) that will be activated or on standby for this 
event: 
 










9. List local Urban Search and Rescue capabilities that will be activated or on standby for this event: 
 







10. List Public Health assets/capabilities that will be deployed or on standby for this event: 
 






11. List the local laboratory and testing facilities and their capabilities:      
            
            
            
             
12. Will the State emergency operations center be activated?  □  yes     □  no   
 
 a. Dates of activation:            
 
 b. Hours of operation:            
 
 c. EOC Director/Point of Contact:           
 
13. List the agencies or Emergency Support Functions that will be activated at the EOC for the event: 
 







14. List State Agencies, Teams or capabilities that will be activated or on standby for the event: 
 







15. Will a Temporary Flight Restriction (TFR) be requested for this event?  □  yes     □  no   




17. Are there any anticipated issues surrounding the TFR request for this event?  □  yes     □  no   
 If yes, please describe in detail:          
            
            
 
18. List any anticipated State and local tactical capability shortfalls for which you may request Federal 
support: 
  







III. TECHNICAL INFORMATION 
 
1.  Are communications systems interoperable among various consequence management, critical 
incident management and law enforcement components? □  yes     □  no 
 
Describe:            
            
            
             
 
2.  Are communications systems interoperable among public health, hospital and medical 
facilities?   □  yes     □  no       
Describe:            
           
           
            
 
3.  FBI Radio System
a.  Has a radio communications frequency plan been developed?  □  yes     □  no 
b.  Will temporary radio repeaters be required at the primary venue?  □  yes     □  no  
c.  Will temporary radio repeaters be required at any secondary venues?  □  yes     □  no 
 
4.  FBI Computer System
a.  Will additional computer capabilities be required at the following locations;  If yes, please 
describe: 
 
  1) JOC?           
            
            
             
 
 2) JIC?           
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 3) IOC?           
            
            
             
 
 b.  Will FBINET computers be utilized at the primary venue?  □  yes    □  no 
  At the following locations: 
  1)  JOC? □  yes □  no 
  2)  JIC? □  yes □  no 
  3)  IOC? □  yes □  no 
 c.  Will  the ICON system be utilized for this event?  □  yes     □  no 
 If so, how many ICON facilitators will be required?        
 d.  Will the LEO Virtual Command Post be utilized?  ?  □  yes     □  no 
 
3. Electrical Power 
 
 a.  Will additional power outlets be required at the following locations;  If yes, please 
    describe: 
  1)  JOC?          
            
            
             
 
  2)  JIC?          
            
            
             
 
  3)  IOC?          
            
            
             
 
 b.  Describe in detail any existing  emergency electrical power system at the following  
  locations: 
  1)  JOC?          
            
            
             
 
  2)  JIC?          
            
            
             
 
  3)  IOC?          
            
            





 c.  Will an electrical transfer switch between grid and generator power be required?   
If yes, at what locations?          
          
          





 a.  Will additional telephone lines be required at any of the following locations: 
  1) JOC? □  yes □  no 
  2) JIC? □  yes □  no 
  3) IOC? □  yes □  no 
 b.  Will high speed Internet service be required at any of the following locations: 
  1) JOC? □  yes □  no 
  2) JIC? □  yes □  no 




 a.  Will video feeds from existing or planned city cameras from local agencies be directed 
     to the following: 
  1) JOC? □  yes □  no 
  2) JIC? □  yes □  no 
  3) IOC? □  yes □  no 
 
IV. INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION 
 
1. Has an interagency intelligence information sharing system been established for this event?  
 □  yes     □  no  
 
2.  Will a joint intelligence center (or similar interagency intelligence center) be activated for this 
event? 
□  yes     □  no  
 
3. Describe any known threats or concerns regarding public safety, as related to this event:    
            
            
            
             
 
4. Describe any historical, political, economic or other significant factors that may attract criminal 
activity or terrorism to this event:          
            
            
            




5. Are demonstration permit requests anticipated for this event?  □  yes     □  no 
If yes, provide details:           
            
            
            
             
 
6. Have demonstration permits been requested for this event?  □  yes     □  no     
If yes, list below: 
 
Name of Group Requesting 
Demonstration Permit 
 
Type of Activity 







 □ Yes  □  No       
  
 
  □ Yes  □  No       
  
 
  □ Yes  □  No       
  
 
  □ Yes  □  No       
  
 
  □ Yes  □  No       
 
7.    What has been (or is anticipated to be) the scope of the media attention for this event (both print and 
broadcast)? 
 □  none     □  minimal (State & Local only)     □  significant (national)     □  international 
 
8. Additional intelligence information:          
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APPENDIX D: INTEGRATION OPTIONS FOR MANAGING 
POLITICALLY CHARGED SPECIAL EVENTS 
The following discussion is offered to demonstrate some of the possible options 
for integrating FBI resources with other local, state, and federal authorities charged with 
managing special events.  The integration strategies are addressed in the context of 
politically charged special events (PCSEs) because there are specific concerns with 
respect to PCSEs that make these events particularly challenging for the FBI.  Many of 
the strategies outlined for managing PCSEs may be applied to major sporting events, 
National Special Security Events, and other significant special events.   
PCSEs require a law enforcement response that is different than other special 
events because PCSEs have wide-reaching political or social impact and they often occur 
within a highly-polarized environment.  Because of their nature, PCSEs tend to receive 
extensive media attention; they often draw large numbers of protestors and 
demonstrators; and they require a significant number of local, state, and federal law 
enforcement resources.   
Changing tactics within the anti-globalization movement,165 the shifting focus of 
law enforcement priorities from prosecution to prevention, and a preoccupation with 
terrorism throughout all levels of government has renewed the debate over how 
aggressively law enforcement should pursue internal dissent and the domestic groups and 
individuals that use violence in furtherance of their political or social goals.  Injuries to 
law enforcement officers during protest events and significant property damage at several 
large-scale demonstrations have prompted police to spend more time and more resources 
planning for PCSEs.  The recognition that there exists a small number of individuals who 
travel in interstate commerce with the express purpose of committing violent acts during 




165 Robert Weissman, “Puppets, Protestors and Police:  April 16 Mobilization Builds Momentum 
against the IMF and World Bank,” Multinational Monitor 21, no. 5 (May 2000), 24-29 at 
http://www.proquest.com/ (Accessed May 24, 2004). 
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may be necessary.  Unfortunately, national planning efforts have not been effectively 
coordinated and no nationwide strategy has emerged for targeting this mobile criminal 
problem. 
Local law enforcement officials are primarily responsible for policing PCSEs, but 
the FBI can play a significant role in assisting with these events.  The FBI has a 
nationwide presence that can provide consistency for a national strategy aimed at 
disrupting the criminal groups that travel between states to commit criminal activity at 
PCSEs.  For this strategy to succeed, however, the FBI must effectively integrate with its 
law enforcement partners.  
A. INTEGRATED PLANNING TEAMS 
The establishment of integrated planning teams that represent law enforcement at 
the local, state and federal level increases the efficiency of the planning process and the 
effectiveness of the operational response to PCSEs.  The integration of FBI agents in all 
aspects of planning, including the initial meetings with demonstration organizers, will 
show there is a clear, deliberate, consistent strategy that will be implemented by law 
enforcement authorities.  Local officials, in conjunction with state and federal officials, 
should clearly articulate conditions for demonstrations and should provide accepted 
standards of conduct in advance of any PCSE.  Acceptable standards of conduct would 
include any form of legal, non-violent activity.  It should be made clear that illegal, non-
violent conduct will be managed by the local authorities, but that any illegal, violent 
conduct may also result in a response by federal law enforcement authorities. 
B. INTEGRATED OPERATIONAL TEAMS   
Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTTFs) have demonstrated that integration of local, 
state, and federal investigative resources results in collective tools that far exceed the 
capabilities of any one of the components.  The task force approach has been extremely 
successful because it enables investigators to approach criminal and terrorism cases from 
a number of different perspectives.  Using investigative task forces to conduct 
appropriately predicated investigations on those who travel between states expressly to 
commit violence during public demonstrations is an essential component of a national 
strategy aimed at managing PCSEs. 
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Field Intelligence Groups (FIGs) are interagency intelligence working groups that 
are centralized within FBI field offices.  They are responsible for the management, 
execution, and coordination of law enforcement intelligence functions.  Integrating the 
FIGs with state and local law enforcement authorities responsible for policing PCSEs is 
an ideal way to coordinate intelligence activities.  The FBI has a large amount of strategic 
intelligence concerning groups and individuals involved in illegal behavior, including 
those who engage in violent activity at protest events.  State and local authorities are 
usually better positioned to provide tactical intelligence that confirms the presence of 
known violent actors and their activities in local areas.  The coordination of intelligence 
collection and distribution efforts through a single Intelligence Operations Center (IOC) 
results in a common operating picture that provides better intelligence coverage for the 
current event.  This approach also fosters legacy intelligence that can be used for future 
events. 
Other successful operational integration concepts that have been used at recent 
PCSEs are the Joint Hazardous Assessment Teams (JHATs) and Joint Hazardous 
Explosive Response Teams (JHERTs).  The JHATs are interagency teams consisting of 
local, state, and federal hazardous materials specialists who respond to and assess 
potential hazardous materials incidents.  The JHERTs are interagency teams consisting of 
local, state, and federal explosive ordnance technicians who respond to and assess 
suspicious packages and improvised explosive devices.  Joint interagency teams 
generally have a larger number of tools at their disposal and they often have inter-
jurisdictional authority contained within a single response element.  JHATs and JHERTs 
are uniquely prepared to respond to the most common technical incidents that arise at 
PCSEs. 
C. INTEGRATED DOCUMENTATION AND PROSECUTION TEAMS 
Local and federal law enforcement officials gather evidence and prepare cases 
according to different rules.  The adoption of integrated evidence collection, arrest, 
identification and interview procedures will result in better documentation of individual 
criminal activity at PCSEs.  Thorough identification of individual arrestees and clear 
documentation of their specific criminal acts increases the likelihood that individuals who 
resort to violence will be held accountable for their actions.  This may translate to more 
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criminal convictions, more accurate criminal history records, and more effective 
collection of criminal intelligence for all levels of law enforcement. 
Cases that arise out of PCSEs that have potential for federal prosecution should be 
developed cooperatively for presentation to both state and federal prosecutors.  Task 
forces consisting of law enforcement officers and prosecutors from state and federal 
agencies should collectively determine whether violent criminal acts that occur at PCSEs 
would be most effectively addressed by state or federal courts.  Development of a clear 
strategy for prosecution is essential to the coordinated national effort aimed at reducing 
the recurring violence associated with PCSEs.   
One of the benefits of aggressively prosecuting crimes that occur at PCSEs is that 
certain crimes qualify as predicate offenses for more complex racketeering prosecutions.  
Appropriately documenting predicate offenses increases the options available for use 
against the violent criminal actors who travel between states to commit violent criminal 
activity at multiple PCSEs.  Subsequent crimes can be investigated as part of a terrorism 
enterprise investigation,166 and they may be prosecuted under the antiracketeering 
statutes, which include the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
Act.167  RICO prosecutions may prove especially useful for dismantling the organizations 
that continually seek to disrupt PCSEs through violent action. 
D. INTEGRATED COMMAND AND CONTROL 
1. Unified Command 
State and local authorities have responsibility for security, crowd control and 
public safety during mass demonstrations.  Day-to-day special event management 
activities are coordinated by state and local authorities consistent with the precepts of the 
National Incident Management System (NIMS).168  Local and state law enforcement 
commanders generally use a concept known as Unified Command to ensure interagency 
situational awareness and to coordinate the overall law enforcement response.  FBI 
command and control assets can be integrated into Unified Command to ensure the 
 
166 U.S. Department of Justice,  AG Guidelines (May 30, 2002), 10. 
167 Title 18, U.S.C. Sections 1951-1968. 
168 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, National Incident Management System (Washington, 
D.C., March 1, 2004). 
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coordination of FBI efforts with state and local law enforcement activities.  The 
integration of FBI command and control assets does not negate or diminish the 
responsibility that state and local officials have for directing law enforcement activities at 
PCSEs. 
2. Information Sharing 
Different law enforcement agencies working the same crisis events use different 
information technology (IT) solutions for managing crisis information.  The FBI and 
other law enforcement agencies routinely work around this limitation by exchanging 
liaison officers between different command posts and operations centers in an attempt to 
maintain situational awareness.  This method of information sharing is dependent upon 
having the right liaison officers in the right command centers at the right time.  
Information exchange occurs around specific issues and problems, but there is often no 
ongoing exchange of “routine” information.  The result is that different command centers 
maintain separate event logs with disparate information.  There is no standardized format 
for exchanging electronic information and there is no common operating picture – a 
problem that leads to duplication and inefficiency in law enforcement resource allocation. 
According to Templar Corporation’s W. Ross Ashley, “Effective critical incident 
response for homeland security requires access to real-time information from many 
organizations.  Command and control, as well as basic situational awareness, are all 
dependant on quickly communicating a dynamically changing picture to a variety of 
decision makers.”169  The NIMS specifically addresses the importance of a common 
operating picture.  It states:  
Integrated systems for communication, information management, and 
intelligence and information sharing allow data to be continuously updated 
during an incident, providing a common framework that covers the 
incident’s life cycle across jurisdictions and disciplines.  A common 
operating picture helps ensure consistency at all levels of incident 
management across jurisdictions, as well as between various governmental 
jurisdictions and private-sector and nongovernmental entities that are 
engaged.170  
 
169 W. Ross Ashley, “Homeland Security: Sharing and Managing Critical Incident Information,” 
Sensors, and Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence (C3I) Technologies for Homeland 
Defense and Law Enforcement II, Edward M. Carapezza, Ed., Proceedings of SPIE 5071 (2003), 6. 
170 U.S. DHS, National Incident Management System, 49. 
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A common operating picture is especially important during critical incidents and 
special events. The FBI uses an incident management database called ICON to manage 
crisis information.  ICON is compatible with the FBI’s Automated Case System (ACS) 
and information that is collected and recorded during crisis operations is synchronized 
and uploaded to ACS so that the FBI maintains only one official system of records.  
Much of the information collected during special events, particularly politically-charged 
special events that involve protest activity, may not be collected or recorded in ICON or 
ACS because of federal privacy legislation.  The FBI has an operational need to monitor 
that activity for planning and situational awareness, however, so a system was developed 
to track, display, and disseminate incident-related information that does not meet the 
criteria for inclusion in an FBI database of record.   
In May 2004, a tool was developed that allows the FBI and other law enforcement 
agencies to share investigative and unclassified intelligence information through an IT 
application that is independent of ICON or ACS.  The solution is Internet-based and 
secure, and it can be accessed by anyone involved in law enforcement or public safety.  
The Virtual Command Center (VCC) on the Law Enforcement Online (LEO) network 
provides a mechanism for local, state and federal law enforcement agencies to track, 
display and disseminate incident and administrative information in almost real time in a 
secure, accessible, and cost-effective way using the existing secure LEO information-
sharing network.   
Many information management tools are available and emerging to perform 
incident command and control.  While no single integrated system or network exists for 
performing this function, programs to set standards and to establish what systems are 
interoperable would go far toward satisfying responders’ needs.171  LEO is a recognized 
and accepted mechanism for sharing information and it is compatible with many existing 
and emerging law enforcement and homeland security communications tools.   
In 2002, a Web interface was designed and implemented that provides a seamless 
bridge between LEO and the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Regional Information 
 
171 The National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism and the U. S. Department of 
Homeland Security, Project Responder:  National Technology Plan for Emergency Response to 
Catastrophic Terrorism, Thomas M. Garwin, Neal A. Pollard, and Robert V. Tuohy, Eds. (Washington, 
D.C., April 2004), 72.  
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Sharing Systems (RISS) network.172  The RISS program supports federal, state, and local 
law enforcement efforts to combat criminal activity that extends across jurisdictional 
boundaries.  It provides information sharing, data analysis, investigative support, 
specialized equipment, technical assistance and training to support investigative and 
prosecutive efforts that address multi-jurisdictional offenses and conspiracies.173  
The Department of Homeland Security developed the Joint Regional Information 
Exchange System (JRIES) to facilitate the exchange of homeland security information 
between the Homeland Security Operations Center (HSOC) and other homeland security 
entities.  JRIES evolved into the Homeland Security Information Network (HSIN), which 
is now DHS’ primary information sharing network for local, state and federal homeland 
security professionals.  JRIES/HSIN, RISS.net and LEO are complementary programs, 
and an interface has been built between JRIES and RISS.net that focuses on terrorism.174  
Although the technical piece has not yet been fully developed, the LEO VCC is expected 
to be fully compatible with HSIN.  Once established, this compatibility will allow law 
enforcement officials to push incident management information (with law enforcement 
sensitive information redacted) to homeland security officials for situational awareness 
and potential action.   
The VCC is still considered a “work in progress,” but it is a powerful tool that 
serves to improve situational awareness during critical incidents and special events.  It is 
a low-cost, high-impact IT solution that provides a common operating picture for public 
safety officers and agencies involved in critical law enforcement and homeland security 
operations. 
E. ISSUES AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS  
There are two primary issues that policymakers must consider when considering 
the use of FBI resources in the policing of PCSEs – First Amendment concerns and 
Privacy Act concerns. 
 
172 Diane Frank, “Justice Pools Online Resources,” Federal Computer Week 16, 30, (August 26, 
2002), 10. 
173 U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Assistance, Program Brief:  Regional Information 
Sharing Systems Program, Open-file report, NCJ 192666 (Washington, D.C., April 2002), 3. 
174 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Press Release:  Homeland Security Information Network 
to Expand Collaboration, Connectivity for States and Major Cities (Washington, D.C., February 24, 2004). 
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1. First Amendment Concerns   
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees, among other 
things, freedom of speech, the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and the right to 
petition the government for a redress of grievances.175  Aggressively integrating federal 
law enforcement resources in managing PCSEs may be seen as having a chilling effect on 
the free exercise of these rights.  Law enforcement has the responsibility of balancing the 
legitimate need to maintain public order with the important interest in protecting First 
Amendment rights.176  Effective integration of FBI resources can preserve that balance if 
those assets work within the existing tools and controls that currently impact federal law 
enforcement operations. 
The U.S. Supreme Court noted in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., that “the 
First Amendment does not protect violence” [where] “there is no question that acts of 
violence occurred.”177  The use of FBI resources should be limited to specifically 
targeting individuals who engage in violent criminal acts during PCSEs, and they should 
not be employed to monitor First-Amendment protected activities or in cases where there 
is a question about whether or not violence is likely to occur.   
Additional controls exist that are sufficient to address other First Amendment 
concerns.  The use of FBI assets in policing PCSEs is subject to FBI Headquarters, 
Department of Justice (DOJ), and Congressional oversight.  Federal prosecutions cannot 
be initiated without the full participation of DOJ and DOJ guidance specifically addresses 
federal prosecution of violent crimes in aid of racketeering.178  The guidance directs 
United States Attorneys to use the racketeering statute selectively based on such factors 
as the type of defendants involved, the relative ability of the Federal and State authorities 
to investigate and prosecute, and the apparent involvement of organized crime figures or 
 
175 U.S. Constitution, amend.1. 
176 Daniel L. Schofield, “Controlling Public Protest: First Amendment Implications,” FBI Law 
Enforcement Bulletin 63, no. 11 (November 1994), 25-32. 
177 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 916 (1982); cited in Jaime I. Roth, “Reptiles in the 
Weeds:  Civil RICO vs. The First Amendment in the Animal Rights Debate,” University of Miami Law 
Review 56, no. 2 (2002), 486. 
178 Title 18 U.S.C. Section 1952. 
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the lack of effective local investigation because of the interstate features of the crime.179  
Even when such factors are present; however, DOJ cautions that the statute is to be 
applied “cautiously and in coordination with state and local officials, to avoid 
jurisdictional conflicts.”180  The proposed state/federal integration strategies are 
consistent with the guidance provided by DOJ. 
Privacy Act concerns.  The Privacy Act of 1974 resulted from the abuses of the 
FBI during the counterintelligence programs (COINTELPROs) of the 1960s and 1970s.  
The Privacy Act governs the collection, use, or dissemination of records maintained on 
individuals.181  The Act has two provisions that are significant to this discussion.  Section 
552a (e) (1) directs each federal agency to only retain information about individuals in its 
records that is “relevant and necessary” to an authorized agency mission.  Section 552a 
(e) (7) provides that each agency shall “maintain no record describing how any individual 
exercises rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless…pertinent to and within the 
scope of an authorized law enforcement activity.”182   
The use of FBI resources is only advocated for implementation within the scope 
of an authorized law enforcement activity.  According to the AG Guidelines, information 
may be collected, retained, and disseminated if it pertains to an open inquiry or 
investigation; provides the predicate to open a new inquiry or investigation; or is relevant 
to any other authorized FBI law enforcement function.183  Employing FBI resources in 
the management of PCSEs falls within the guidelines because the FBI has the 
responsibility and jurisdiction for management of special events and investigation of 
federal crimes – two authorized law enforcement functions.184  
There are distinct differences between the COINTELPROs of the 1960s and 
1970s and the proposed integration of FBI assets into the policing of PCSEs.  First, the 
 
179 United States Department of Justice, Resource Book:  Handbook on the Comprehensive Crime 
Control Act of 1984 and Other Criminal Statutes Enacted by the 98th Congress” (Washington, D.C., 
December 1984), 100. 
180 Ibid. 
181 Title 5 U.S.C. Section 552a. 
182 Ibid. 
183 U.S. Department of Justice, AG Guidelines, (May 30, 2002), 23. 
184 President Clinton, PDD-62; U.S. Department of Justice, AG Guidelines (May 30, 2002), 15. 
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COINTELPROs were instituted in an era when the FBI was not subject to the intense 
scrutiny it faces today.  Second, the COINTELPROs were covert programs that supported 
the “massive surveillance and intelligence apparatus of the Bureau, which had long 
functioned to identify ‘subversive’ threats to national security.”185  The Bureau did not 
seek to react in a measured way to specific criminal activity, it acted “covertly and 
proactively to hinder targets’ capacity to engage in protest activity.”186    The proposed 
solution to the current problem is to integrate FBI assets overtly with other local and state 
law enforcement officers and to target FBI resources only at those individuals involved in 







185 David Cunningham, “Understanding State Responses to Left- versus Right-Wing Threats: The 
FBI’s Repression of the New Left and the Ku Klux Klan,” Social Science History 27, no. 3 (2003), 329. 
186 David Cunningham, “The Patterning of Repression: FBI Counterintelligence and the New Left,” 
Social Forces 82, no. 1 (September 2003), 210. 
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